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The doctrine treating federal preemption of state law has been plagued by
uncertainty and confusion. Part of the problem is that courts purport to in-
terpret congressional intent when often Congress has never considered the
particular preemption question at issue. This Article suggests that courts
deciding preemption cases should take seriously a commonly articulated
rationale for the federalization of law: the need to coordinate applicable
legal standards in order to facilitate a national market or to otherwise pro-
vide clear guidance to parties regarding the laws that apply to their
conduct. In situations where federal law can serve a coordinating function
but congressional intent regarding preemption is unclear we propose that
courts consider whether the states have effectively allocated sovereign au-
thority among themselves through choice-of-law rules. Where states have
achieved such "horizontal coordination," Congress often has little need to
usurp the states' role as laboratories for experimenting with potentially di-
verse substantive laws. Our approach would help to promote a "healthy
federalism" by encouraging courts to preserve the benefits of local and
state sovereignty while simultaneously enabling federal statutes to coordi-
nate U.S. law where necessary. To show how our approach might improve
preemption decisions, we apply it to several areas in which the courts have
struggled. Although our approach provides a conceptually obvious, and
therefore elegant, solution to many preemption problems, to date it has
been entirely unexplored.
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INTRODUCTION
Preemption doctrine is plagued by both indeterminacy and incoherence.1
These problems likely reflect the inevitable tension in a federal system be-
tween the appeal of having one clearly applicable federal policy and a
commitment to preserving state and local sovereign authority. Unfortunate-
ly, the Supreme Court has not yet found a sensible way to balance these
competing values. The Court's preemption decisions sometimes stress the
benefits of state sovereignty and diversity while, at other times, the Court
1. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085
(2000); Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 Sup. CT. REV. 175, 178;
S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685,
733-37 (1991); Marin R. Scordato, Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims, 35 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1, 32 (2001); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 459 (2008); Robert N. Weiner, The Height of Pre-
sumption: Preemption and the Role of Courts, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 727 (2009).
[Vol. 111:647
Preemption and Choice-of-Law Coordination
asserts a need to protect federal policy from the vagaries of different state
policies.2 The justices' rhetoric seems to vacillate between these two pillars
of federalism depending on the individual circumstances of the case.3 Rather
than utilizing a nuanced view of the circumstances under which federal pol-
icy displaces state law, the Court's preemption cases seem preoccupied with
presumptions and rules that emphasize gross dichotomies.4
Courts ostensibly attempt to glean congressional intent regarding the de-
gree to which a federal law preempts state law.' Although the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution6 enables Congress to displace state law in
order to advance federal policy goals, 7 Congress cannot foresee all possible
preemption scenarios or perfectly articulate the effect of its laws in all situa-
tions.8 Moreover, silence regarding a preemption question can be the
unfortunate product of political compromise 9 with strong political forces
often preventing Congress from explicitly addressing the question of state
sovereignty. When Congress fails to clarify the extent to which overlapping
state laws are displaced, the courts attempt to discern both Congress's policy
goals and the extent to which Congress would tolerate state laws that have
the potential to conflict with federal policy. The former determination is
notoriously difficult for courts to make, given that congressional bills are
often multifaceted and the votes of more than 500 members of Congress can
reflect a variety of very different policy goals."° Congress's willingness to
accommodate overlapping state law requires an even more nuanced analysis
and is therefore even harder to determine with confidence.I
On the surface, the Supreme Court has resisted efforts to fill voids in
legislative intent with the justices' own views on the relative normative de-
sirability of federal and state substantive policies. In this sense, the Court
seems wary of usurping congressional prerogatives. Instead, the Court has
2. See William W. Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives
on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 624-39 (1975) (describing the
Court's historic oscillation between favoring federal interests and preferring state autonomy).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 29-56.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 29-56.
5. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 42.
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
7. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
727, 729 (2008); see also Stephen A, Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 767 (1994).
8. Kenneth L. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L. F.
515, 540.
9. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 614-15 (2009)
(discussing this possibility).
10. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 61 (1994); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They,"
Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
11. For example, the majority and dissent disagreed over how to assess congressional
willingness to tolerate overlapping state law in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861 (2000), a case discussed infra in note 52 and accompanying text.
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turned to a set of generally applicable doctrines that enable courts (if they so
choose) to avoid a detailed analysis of the merits of the substantive legal
rules at issue.
Specifically, the Court has developed a set of presumptions to resolve
cases where congressional intent is unclear. 2 For example, the Court often
presumes that Congress has not displaced state laws when it legislates in an
area traditionally regulated by the states. Conversely, the court tends to pre-
sume that Congress intended to preempt state laws when Congress acts in an
area that it has pervasively regulated or when state laws could conflict with
congressional objectives. These presumptions frequently conflict, however,
and the justices often offer splintered opinions, with a majority emphasizing
the applicability of one presumption and dissenting justices emphasizing
another. 3 In the end, it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the decisions
are based on unarticulated policy judgments that are operating offstage. 4
Preemption decisions thus lack transparency, may turn on poor policy rea-
soning that is deprived of robust discussion and debate, and fail to provide
useful guidance for future cases.
Legal scholars often advocate that the Court promote clarity by consist-
ently applying a single presumption when congressional intent is unclear. 5
Some argue that the courts should consistently presume preemptive intent in
order to promote legal uniformity or the development of a national market,
or to force Congress to deal with preemption issues.' 6 Others argue, to the
contrary, that the courts should presume against preemptive intent in order
to preserve state sovereignty or force Congress to act explicitly when it in-
tends to displace state laws. 7 Regardless of the approaches they propose,
virtually all preemption scholars seem focused on the proper allocation be-
tween state and federal power, a concern that we label "vertical
coordination." While this is clearly the central issue embedded in the Su-
premacy Clause, in many cases a vertical coordination approach, standing
12. These presumptions are articulated more fully infra in Part 1. Actually, the doctrines
discussed in Part I include both presumptions and articulated rules. But because both types of
doctrine lead courts to draw dichotomous conclusions based on categorizations in the case of
congressional silence regarding preemption, we refer to both as "presumptions."
13. For examples of splintered opinions, see infra Part IV.
14. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 7, at 741-42 ("In a word, the Court's preemption doc-
trine is substantively empty. This emptiness helps mask the fact that courts are actually
making substantive decisions in the name of preemption."); Note, Pre-emption as a Preferen-
tial Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208, 208 (1959) (noting
criticism that the Supreme Court's preemption decisions represent "extreme examples of the
unwarranted substitution of judicial wisdom for that of Congress").
15. See infra Section II.B (discussing various theories of preemption).
16. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 138-139 and accompanying text. For other arguments in favor of a
presumption against preemption, see Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal
Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 565, 613-18 (1997), and S. Candice
Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REv. 685, 710-14,
764-66 (1991).
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alone, provides inadequate guidance for drawing the line between federal
and state regulatory authority.
This Article proposes a horizontal coordination approach to preemption.
Unlike other approaches that uniformly promote either more federal law or
more state law, our approach is designed to help produce a healthy balance
between enhancing the goals of federal law while preserving the authority of
states to resolve legal problems in diverse ways. In many preemption cases,
our approach would provide helpful guidance to courts.
One important function of federalizing laws is to coordinate the govem-
ing law for parties. 8 However, clarity regarding governing laws sometimes
can be produced by means short of eliminating state law and its benefits. We
argue that in preemption cases courts should take into account "horizontal
coordination," or the degree to which the states have effectively allocated
sovereign authority among themselves.' 9 Specifically, court preemption de-
cisions should consider whether the states have voluntarily adopted a
choice-of-law rule for the substantive legal question at issue clarifying
which state has sovereign authority to regulate the matter. If so, a court
should further consider whether that allocation serves functionally to con-
tain the effects of each state's laws. If the states have coalesced around such
a choice-of-law rule for a given subject matter, this coordination indicates
that each state is willing to have other states experiment with the content of
laws and that the effects of such laws are not spilling over in harmful ways
to people and activities located in other states.20 In these circumstances,
Congress may have little need to usurp the states' role as laboratories for
experimenting with potentially diverse substantive laws.
States' coalescence around a single choice-of-law approach is a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition for concluding that the states have
effectively coordinated sovereign authority. Sometimes, choice of law is
18. One consequence of the Erie doctrine is that federal courts cannot coordinate the
governing law for parties on matters of substance governed by state law. See Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,496 (1941) (holding that choice of law is substantive for
Erie purposes and that therefore federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-
law principles of the state in which the district court is located). We, and others, have
advocated elsewhere that Congress enact uniform choice-of-law principles for interstate ac-
tivities, but Congress has been generally disinterested in legislating on choice-of-law issues.
See ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 47-49 (2009) (discussing
general congressional reluctance to legislate regarding choice of state laws). Without a federal
vehicle for coordinating state choice-of-law policies, the remaining alternative for coordinat-
ing the governing law is to federalize the substantive legal principles themselves.
19. Allan Erbsen recently identified the interrelationship between somewhat analogous
concepts that he called horizontal federalism and vertical federalism. However, his analysis
differs from ours in that his analysis focuses on horizontal federalism without regard to its
possible implications for vertical federalism. See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93
MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008).
20. Others have discussed the possible spillover effects of state law. See Samuel Issa-
charoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1353, 1368
(2006); Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38
ARiz. L. REV. 917, 922 (1996). Our contribution in this Article is to tie the problem of spillo-
ver effects to state choice-of-law policies.
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coordinated as a formal matter but one state's exercise of authority ends up
functionally displacing the authority of the other states. Often this happens
when a choice-of-law rule that sensibly allocates state sovereign authority
with regard to some matters proves inadequate to coordinate sovereign au-
thority in other situations to which the rule applies. This can happen when
legal rules applicable in one state influence activities in other states. Consid-
er, for example, state laws that attempt to regulate employee training and
safety equipment aboard oil tankers. Even if each state coordinated around a
choice-of-law rule that limited state sovereign authority to oil tankers oper-
ating in that state's waters, functional noncoordination would result when
that rule is applied to tankers that operate in the waters of-and therefore
that must comply with the regulations of-many states and nations."1 Tank-
ers might cope with this situation by complying with the most stringent
laws, but then the jurisdiction with the most stringent laws would end up
dominating the jurisdictions with less onerous rules. And if state regulations
require that the tankers take differing measures, the cumulative effect of
state laws might prove cripplingly burdensome to tankers. In general, taking
into account functional as well as formal coordination recognizes that, while
state choice-of-law rules can be powerful coordination mechanisms, they are
not necessarily coextensive with a healthy federalism.
We suggest a more refined analysis for deciding preemption cases than
the blunt and obfuscating presumptions the courts currently apply. Under
our approach, implicit considerations about the substantive desirability of
state and federal law can be replaced with a transparent and more apt focus
on promoting a healthy federalism. Our horizontal coordination approach is
not based on any particular theory of congressional intent. Rather, where
appropriate, it asks courts to fill a gap in legislative intent by looking to the
values embedded in the federal system in which Congress, the courts, and
the states operate. It also provides a general guideline that cuts across the
substantive areas in which Congress legislates.
We argue that a horizontal coordination approach promotes a "healthy
federalism," a term that we introduce and seek to explain here. In our view,
when the federal system operates properly, states should be permitted to
preserve sovereign powers to experiment with potentially diverse substan-
tive laws when that experimentation is likely to produce better laws in the
long run. As we have argued elsewhere, good laws are more likely to evolve
when state powers are constrained by effective jurisdictional competition.2 2
For jurisdictional competition to be effective, two forces must be present.
First, when states experiment with their laws in particularly undesirable
ways, people and firms begin to relocate their activities and their assets to
other states. 23 Conversely, states can attract citizens and businesses by ex-
perimenting with desirable laws. Jurisdictional competition need not result
21. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (discussing need for uniform
federal law in this context).
22. See generally O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 18.
23. Id. at 28.
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in a single legal rule being adopted in all jurisdictions, however. Indeed,
another benefit to state law is that when parties can choose among diverse
laws, they can more effectively satisfy their inevitably diverse preferences,
needs, and constraints. When the boundaries between state laws are not
clearly and coherently drawn, however, parties might not be able to forecast
the legal standards that apply to their conduct, and thus they might be forced
to comply with the laws of all potentially relevant states. Moreover, if par-
ties can neither avoid jurisdictions with undesirable laws nor contract for
favorable laws, states with undesirable laws will not be pressured into enact-
ing better ones. When state laws promote a race to the bottom or carry the
potential for multiple laws to apply to a single action, the resulting
federalism is not healthy. Such unhealthy federalism hinders U.S. markets
by increasing the cost of conducting interstate and international commerce,24
and it can impoverish our citizens. In contrast, presuming that federal law
displaces state law when the states have coherently allocated sovereign au-
thority on their own can work to destroy the potential benefits of state laws.
Preemption under the Supremacy Clause enables Congress and the
courts to act as a team in appropriately allocating state and federal regulato-
ry authority.25 When Congress has spoken on a particular issue, courts use
the preemption doctrine primarily to fill statutory gaps that leave unclear the
extent to which state and federal laws should coexist. But achieving an op-
timal balance through preemption policy can be tricky. Interpreting federal
statutes' preemptive effect too narrowly impedes effective policymaking,
including coordination, by Congress. On the other hand, preempting too
readily might undermine efficient jurisdictional competition among the
states. Implementing our horizontal regulatory coordination approach in
preemption cases would help ensure that the courts give federal and state
legislation their respective, appropriate scopes.
In sum, state self-discipline through effective choice-of-law rules should
be an important consideration in preemption cases. In the absence of clear
congressional intent to the contrary, courts should hesitate to preempt where
states are applying choice-of-law rules that clearly and sensibly allocate
state sovereign authority. Conversely, the states' failure to adopt choice-of-
law rules that sensibly allocate sovereign authority supports preemption in
favor of a single federal law. Although our approach cannot alone solve all
preemption cases, it clearly supports less preemption in some areas and
greater preemption in others as compared to likely results under current
preemption doctrine.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes current preemp-
tion law, demonstrating the inadequacy of the presumptions that courts have
applied to resolve preemption issues. Part II explores the respective yet
24. See Erin O'Hara O'Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, Exit and the American Illness, in
THE AMERICAN ILLNESS (EH. Buckley ed., forthcoming Mar. 2013), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1745141.
25. Of course, other constitutional provisions also help allocate state and federal law-
making authority, a discussion we defer to infra in Section III.A.
Michigan Law Review
sometimes overlapping roles of horizontal and vertical coordination in our
federal system, and it discusses the varying institutional mechanisms that
can be used by the federal government to encourage the states to achieve
effective horizontal coordination. Part III articulates our regulatory coordi-
nation approach to preemption and places it in the context of existing
preemption doctrine and theory. Part IV applies the coordination approach
to resolve specific coordination problems that arise in Supreme Court cases.
I. PROBLEMS WITH PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The Supremacy Clause provides as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.26
The mandate that a state "shall be bound" by federal law "notwithstand-
ing" a state constitutional provision or statute at least requires that state law
give way to federal law if the former is directly "contrary" to the latter.27 But
the clause doesn't directly resolve the bulk of preemption cases that come to
the Supreme Court, cases involving state and federal laws that do not con-
flict on their face but that address the same or similar problems.
Preemption is clearest when an actor cannot comply with both laws be-
cause a federal law mandates what the state law forbids or vice versa.
28
Conflict also can arise where parties can comply with both laws but state
law is either more or less restrictive than the federal law, or where the two
laws regulate the same activity but in different ways. In the absence of a
congressional statement about Congress's intended displacement of state
law, courts must determine whether the state and federal regimes may co-
exist. Preemption issues often arise in this gray area.
The Supreme Court has formulated a set of presumptions or rules to
help guide preemption analysis. We briefly describe four here, acknowledg-
ing that our discussion is somewhat simplistic but adequate for present
purposes. First, if Congress regulates an area traditionally left to the states,
the Court may presume that "the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and mani-
fest purpose of Congress. '29 For example, in Gregory v. Ashcroft,30 the Court
26. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
27. The two are directly contrary when it is impossible for a party to comply with both
laws. Howard P. Walthall, Jr., Comment, Chevron v. Federalism: A Reassessment of Deference
to Administrative Preemption, 28 CUMB. L. REv. 715, 721 (1998).
28. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)
(state law preempted where compliance with both state and federal law found to be a "physi-
cal impossibility").
29. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
30. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not preempt a Mis-
souri constitutional requirement that state judges retire at age seventy. The
Court reasoned that, because states traditionally determine their judges'
qualifications, the federal statute should not apply to state judges absent a
clear congressional statement of intent.3 More generally, in such state-
dominated areas as torts, property, contracts, corporate law, family law,
insurance law, trusts and estates, and agency law, the presumption should
work in favor of federal law operating alongside state law.
32
In contrast, when Congress has established a pervasive scheme of feder-
al regulation, the Court applies a "field preemption" presumption that
Congress intended to displace all state law in the field.33 Examples of areas
deemed subject to field preemption include air traffic noise and immigra-
tion.3 4
The Court has also determined that federal law preempts state law when
the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."35 For example, in Felder v.
Casey, the Court held that federal law preempted a Wisconsin statute requir-
ing plaintiffs to file notices of claim prior to suing government officials
because the statute was an obstacle to the congressional purpose of ensuring
compensation for violations of federal civil rights laws.36
Finally, federal laws override state and local policies that can affect for-
eign affairs in order to enable the federal government to speak with a clear
voice. For example, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council involved a
federal law that enabled the president to impose sanctions on Burma to the
extent that such sanctions would protect U.S. security interests, democracy,
and human rights.37 The federal law was deemed to preempt a Massachu-
setts law that prohibited state entities from procuring goods or services from
companies engaged in commerce with Burma.3 8 The Court reasoned that the
state law could interfere with the finely tuned calibration of economic pres-
sure necessary for effective presidential diplomacy.3 9
31. Gregory, 501 U.S. 460-61.
32. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001) (family law); Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (tort duty to warn); Hayfield N. R.R. Co. v. Chi. & Nw. Transp.
Co., 467 U.S. 622 (1984) (eminent domain power).
33. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006)
(federal securities law).
34. R. Seth Davis, Note, Conditional Preemption, Commandeering, and the Values of
Cooperative Federalism: An Analysis of Section 216 of EPAct, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 404, 430
n. 178 (2008).
35. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). For evidence that the Court's use of
obstacle preemption may be on the decline, see Gregory M. Dickinson, An Empirical Study of
Obstacle Preemption in the Supreme Court, 89 NEB. L. REv. 682 (2011).
36. 487 U.S. 131, 137-38 (1988).
37. 530 U.S. 363, 369-70 (2000).
38. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 378-80.
39. ld. at 380-81.
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These preemption principles create confusion rather than clarification
for multiple reasons. First, the preemption rules often conflict with one
another.40 Because both state and federal regulation can be pervasive, the
Court can often categorize the law as reaching into areas of traditional state
regulation and federal government occupation, especially where Congress
has recently but comprehensively legislated into an area previously left to
the states. Even when the area is clearly one traditionally governed by state
rather than federal law, the state law often can be characterized as an obsta-
cle to the objectives of federal legislation.
More fundamentally, courts' applications of the preemption principles
can mask judicial policymaking under the guise of legislative intent. Courts
usually treat preemption as an issue of statutory interpretation, 4H recognizing
that "[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." 42 This makes
sense since federal "laws" and "treaties" are the basis of preemption under
the Supremacy Clause. The problem with this approach is that Congress
frequently fails to specify whether the state law should coexist with federal
law, and even if it does, it generally leaves some ambiguity about exactly
which state laws are displaced. The court then has no choice but to make
some policy judgment as to the allocation of power between states and the
federal government. 43 Yet the courts are reluctant to admit that they are fill-
ing congressional gaps with their own judgments.44 This "disconnect"
between judicial rhetoric and action45 results in a lack of transparency and in
decisions that appear inconsistent, ad hoc, and formalistically reasoned.
The confusion created by preemption jurisprudence can be illustrated
with a few examples. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul46 held
that a California law regulating immature avocados based on oil content
(thus favoring California's oilier avocados over Florida's avocados) was not
preempted by a federal regulation that placed standards on the sale of avo-
cados based on considerations other than oil content. The majority reasoned
that the supervision of food marketing was traditionally a state matter,47 jus-
tifying a presumption against preemption. However, four dissenting justices
thought that the matter was governed by obstacle preemption and the need
40. See infra Part IV.
41. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1, 393
(8th ed. 2010).
42. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963); see
also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996); Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994).
43. Merrill, supra note 7, at 729.
44. See id. at 742 (concluding that "courts are actually making substantive [policy]
decisions in the name of preemption").
45. See Jamelle C. Sharpe, Toward (A) Faithful Agency in the Supreme Court's Preemp-
tion Jurisprudence, 18 GEO. MASON L. REv. 367 (2011) (discussing the "disconnect" between
courts' rhetoric of construing legislative intent and their practice of making policy judgments).
46. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
47. Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 144. The Court remanded the case for further considera-
tion of whether the California law might violate the Commerce Clause. Id. at 158-59.
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for uniform standards to facilitate the orderly marketing of avocados. 48 In
contrast, in Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,49 a majority of justices concluded
that federal flour packaging standards preempted California law, where the
federal standards would have permitted flour packages to vary somewhat
from their stated weight but state law required that commodity quantities be
no less than the net weight stated on the package. The majority reasoned
that the California regulation created obstacles to the federal standard,
which would protect sellers from weight variations due to loss of moisture.50
If the state law survived, then out-of-state sellers packaging for California
would put more flour into each container than those not also selling in Cali-
fornia, and the weight disparities would create consumer confusion that
could undermine the federal packaging laws. The dissenters found the ma-
jority's concern to be based on "supposition" and "inference" and therefore
insufficient to overcome the general presumption against preemption.5
Consider also Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. 2 in which the Court
held that a common law tort claim for negligent automobile design based on
the lack of airbags was an obstacle to a federal motor vehicle safety law re-
quiring some vehicles to have airbags. The dissenters reasoned that that this
federal objective was not strong enough to overcome the traditional pre-
sumption against preemption.53 Yet in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of
America, Inc.,5" the Court held that the same motor vehicle safety law,
which also let manufacturers choose between lap and lap-and-shoulder belts
for rear seats, did not preempt a California tort suit. The Williamson Court
reasoned that obstacle preemption was inapplicable because manufacturer
choice was not a significant federal regulatory objective .5 These cases are
not readily reconcilable by the Court's reasoning, perhaps because the pre-
sumptions rationalize results based on unexpressed policy considerations.
5 6
Preemption cases are inherently difficult for courts, especially because
many potential policy concerns can influence case decisions. In the next
Part, we propose that courts take into consideration one policy concern that
has never been explored in the academic literature but that can prove very
helpful in many preemption cases. Our approach is rooted in federalism
48. Id. at 132 (White, J., dissenting).
49. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
50. Jones, 430 U.S. at 543.
51. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
53. Geier, 529 U.S. at 894-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011).
55. Williamson, 131 S. Ct. at 1137-38.
56. For a terrific discussion of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's
preemption position in Williamson and its influence on the outcome of the case, see Catherine
M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 544-45 (2012). Sharkey's
analysis suggests that agency positions can strongly influence the Court's determination re-
garding obstacle preemption. Id. We consider the potentially useful role of agencies in
preemption analysis infra in Sections II.E.2 and IV.D.
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principles rather than in legislative intent, and it can guide courts in a
straightforward and legitimate manner.
II. COORDINATION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
Preemption cases should take account of the fact that a healthy federal-
ism can be promoted by both (1) "horizontal" coordination among the states
through choice-of-law rules or otherwise, and (2) "vertical" coordination
between the states and the federal government. Moreover, a healthy federal-
ism is best promoted by remaining mindful of the fact that effective
horizontal coordination can and sometimes should substitute for federally
imposed uniformity.57 As always, governing considerations must enable
courts to sensibly draw the line between state and federal authority. This
Part begins constructing our framework by more fully articulating our coor-
dination principle, which entails a focus on the extent to which states have
voluntarily allocated their sovereign authority through uniform choice-of-
law principles. Part III then describes how the coordination principle should
guide preemption decisions.
A federal system must reconcile the potentially contradictory values of
respecting the sovereignty of the states and facilitating national policy, in-
cluding the creation of a national market. Federal law's primacy often
is premised on the need for coordinated policy within the United States, but
sometimes that coordination can be achieved while still retaining state sov-
ereign authority. Section II.A discusses the benefits of preserving, where
possible, the potential welfare-increasing effects of state sovereignty. These
effects include fostering experimentation, enabling parties to avoid welfare-
reducing laws, and providing choices among diverse laws to suit diverse
needs. Our analysis highlights an important factor overlooked in virtually all
preemption analyses to date: the states' ability to achieve horizontal coordi-
nation among themselves through choice-of-law rules. States' ability to
coordinate in this way often reduces or eliminates the need for federally
imposed uniformity, which in turn suggests that the preemptive reach of
federal law should be narrowly construed. Where, however, the states have
not effectively coordinated, courts should give federal statutes broader
preemptive effect.
Section 11.8 discusses the costs of state sovereignty where horizontal
coordination is inadequate. For example, state lawmakers may have incen-
tives to impose regulatory costs on outsiders for the benefit of in-state
interest groups or to underregulate activities whose full costs are inflicted in
other states. Poorly designed state choice-of-law rules can exacerbate these
problems. Section II.C describes various ways in which states can minimize
the costs of state sovereignty, including by coordinating sovereign authority
57. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Legal Process and the Discovery of
Better Policies for Fostering Innovation and Growth, in RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING
INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 463 (2011); John F Coyle, Rethinking
the Commercial Law Treaty, 45 GA. L. REV. 343 (2011); Erin O'Hara O'Connor, The Limits of
Contract Law Harmonization, 33 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 505 (2012).
[Vol. 111:647
Preemption and Choice-of-Law Coordination
through choice-of-law rules. As we will see, whether states are employing
this coordination mechanism, either tacitly or explicitly, is a factor that helps
inform the need for federal preemption. Section II.D explores the federal
government's role in helping achieve horizontal regulatory coordination
through preemption, federally imposed choice-of-law rules, and enforce-
ment of choice-of-law and choice-of-court agreements. Section II.E
describes structural mechanisms for resolving preemption issues: congres-
sional preemption and savings clauses, administrative agency delegation,
and court determination.
A. Benefits of Multiple Laws
There are significant benefits to having multiple lawmaking authorities
generate rules and regulations.58 First, as Justice Louis Brandeis famously
observed, multiple lawmakers enable laboratories of experimentation.59 A
legislature cannot design perfectly efficient laws given limits on knowledge
and information. Endowing states with sovereign power facilitates meaning-
ful legal experimentation that ultimately promotes the enactment of better
laws.60
Second, even an omniscient legislature likely cannot design laws that
perfectly suit its constituents' diverse needs and differing economic, social,
and other environments. If parties can choose from multiple state laws, they
might be able to obtain a better fit between their activities and the governing
rules. 61
Third, multiple governing laws can constrain powerful interest groups'
ability to lobby for laws that favor their members at others' expense.62 The
costs of special-interest legislation can be minimized by exit, whereby indi-
viduals either move their activities to another jurisdiction 63 or otherwise
choose a different governing legal regime. Parties often can exit a nation's
laws by avoiding that nation altogether because the jurisdictional reach of
the nation's authority is necessarily limited. 64 A federal system enhances
58. We have described these advantages in more detail elsewhere. See O'HARA & RIB-
STEIN, supra note 18, ch. 2.
59. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
60. See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGIATISM 179-82 (1999) (making this argument in
context of environmental laws).
61. A single state may be able to generate a menu of rules from which parties can
choose. See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corpo-
rate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475
(2011). But these examples are rare and almost never extend beyond the generation of a sec-
ond regulatory option.
62. For the classic treatment of interest groups' relative abilities to influence legislative
decisions, see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (rev. ed. 1971).
63. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 424 (1956) (finding that the problem of special-interest legislation is minimized if indi-
viduals are fully mobile).
64. For apparent examples of businesses exiting states with undesirable laws, see Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federalism to Takings, 7 GEo.
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exit options because moving across state rather than national boundaries is
less costly. Federalism allows the mover to retain the basic legal rights and
governance rules contained in federal laws and principles.
B. The Problems of State Sovereignty
Although having multiple sovereign states within a federal system can
provide clear benefits, multiple laws can also prove costly. If one state's
laws can apply to people and events in other states, then the regulatory costs
of that state's laws can spill over into other states, causing problems for oth-
er sovereigns. Spillovers can occur when interest groups in one state benefit
from laws that hurt outsiders who may be poorly represented in that state's
legislature. Spillovers result when a state extends its regulatory authority
beyond its borders, but they can also result when a state generates a law de-
sired by out-of-state parties who attempt to choose that law by contract or
other activities.
Spillover problems from extraterritorial regulation can take several
forms, but our approach primarily addresses one form of the problem: the
costs imposed on national parties when jurisdictional authority over a given
activity is either uncertain or entrusted to multiple states. 65 In either case, the
interstate actor is forced to plan for the possibility that multiple states' laws
must be investigated and complied with.66 The interaction of multiple gov-
erning laws can burden the party in ways not desired by any single
jurisdiction. Moreover, compliance with the most burdensome law (a com-
mon strategy for national firmS)67 can effectively thwart the policies of states
attempting to experiment with more liberal laws.
A separate potential spillover problem involves the "race for the bot-
tom"' 68 that can occur when a choice-of-law rule enables firms and
individuals to choose the state law that applies to them. States may attract
national actors with their lax laws, and those actors can use their regulatory
freedom in ways that cause harm in other states. Our focus on regulatory
coordination is not intended to address this problem. Put differently, we rec-
ognize the prevention of a race to the bottom as a basis for federal
MASON L. REV. 293 (1999) (describing how state insurance regulations cause insurance firms
to attempt to exit the state), and Jonathan Klick et al., The Effect of Contract Regulation: The
Case of Franchising (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 07-03, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=951464 (finding that fran-
chise industry employment as proportion of total employment falls in states imposing
franchise regulations).
65. Issacharoff and Sharkey focus on spillovers as a rationalization for federalization.
See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 20. Although they emphasize the need for federal law
to prevent states from imposing spillovers onto one another and to provide a coordinated poli-
cy, they miss the potential for horizontal coordination on choice of law as emphasized here.
66. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 924-25 (discussing problem in context of state
products liability laws in national markets).
67. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 20, at 1386.
68. This phrase was coined by William Cary. See William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974).
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preemption even in some situations where the states have coordinated
around a choice-of-law rule.
Of course, the effects of state laws very often are felt in other states, and
often these laws are respected by other sovereigns notwithstanding such
spillover. Precisely because spillovers need not be deemed costly, state
choice-of-law policies become important factors in evaluating state exercis-
es of sovereign authority. When states voluntarily coalesce around a single
approach to choice-of-law issues or develop a consensus in favor of enforc-
ing choice-of-law clauses, the coordination likely reflects the states'
collective judgment that the choice-of-law approach sensibly allocates sov-
ereign authority and therefore minimizes costly spillovers. Conversely,
states that prefer to preserve their own sovereignty may be unwilling to coa-
lesce around a choice-of-law rule that effectively balances these competing
interests. These latter situations may be appropriate for federal action, as
discussed in Section II.D.
C. State Horizontal Coordination
A healthy federalism attempts to delimit state regulatory authority so as
to enhance the benefits provided by multiple sovereigns while reducing
costly regulatory spillovers. This Section explores the states' ability to coor-
dinate, either through agreement or independent action, to achieve such
objectives. As discussed above, in some cases the states' lack of coordina-
tion will call for broad application of federal laws. Indeed, U.S. choice of
law is generally understood to be a mess, 6 9 with the states applying varied
and unpredictable choice-of-law standards.7" Our impression is that federal-
ization of laws in the United States gained strong momentum as the states
abandoned uniform choice-of-law rules in favor of these unpredictable
standards.7" However, despite this general trend toward choice-of-law chaos,
the states have managed to coordinate on choice of law in several important
areas. This potential for self-coordination is important to our analysis
69. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice
of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991); Hillel Y Levin, What Do We Really Know About the
American Choice-of-Law Revolution?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 247, 248 (2007) (book review);
Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MIcH. L. REV.
2448, 2449 (1999).
70. See generally LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS chs. 2-3 (6th ed. 2011).
71. New York began to experiment with a new approach to choice of law in the 1950s.
Commentators, starting with Brainerd Currie, and other states began proposing and adopting
varied new approaches to choice of law beginning in 1960. See generally id. at ch. 3. Strong
federalization of laws occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. See Craig M. Bradley, Racketeer-
ing and the Federalization of Crime, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 213, 242-54 (1984) (describing an
"era of activism" in federal criminal law starting around 1960); E. Donald Elliott et al., To-
ward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 313, 313 (1985) (pegging strong federalization of environmental law to the post-1960
time period); Damien Geradin, The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What the
EU Should Learn from American Experience, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 6 (2004) (asserting that
the federalization of a range of policies occurred in the 1960s and 1970s).
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because, where present, it dampens the need for federal preemption of state
regulatory authority.
States can coordinate in various ways. First, states can refrain from en-
acting laws with effects that spill over into other states. To be sure, the
increasing geographic scope of business and the mobility of people and
firms makes it inevitable that state regulation will affect the national econo-
my. However, there remain situations in which the choice-of-law rule
reasonably tracks states' appropriate interests in applying their laws. In such
cases, spillovers are sometimes mutually tolerated, as discussed below.
Second, states can adopt uniform state substantive laws. States' enact-
ment of uniform laws can reduce the variation and experimentation that are
key benefits of state sovereignty. However, uniform state law proposals can
be superior to an imposed federal law because the adoption of uniform laws
can reflect a broader consensus and because voluntary adoption leaves states
the opportunity to fine-tune the extent of uniformity and experiment with
alternative laws as warranted by economic, social, or other circumstances.
In some cases, states have in fact adopted uniform laws that have provided
effective coordination. 72
Third, and most importantly for purposes of our analysis, states can
commit to a common set of choice-of-law rules that clearly delineate the
boundaries of each state's lawmaking authority. Clear choice-of-law rules
enable firms and individuals to plan their activities knowing the governing
legal standards, and they help parties avoid having to comply with multiple
and potentially conflicting legal rules.73 Consistent with this pro-
predictability policy, states have given parties fairly wide latitude to contract
for their governing laws and courts, particularly in large commercial con-
tracts 74 and through the rule applying the law of the place of incorporation
to the internal affairs of a company.75 Some rules, such as the situs rule for
real property,76 provide an obviously sensible basis for clearly allocating
sovereign authority. Cooperative allocation of authority can produce overall
benefits for the states because deference to others' sovereign authority can
72. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uni-
formity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34 EcON. INQUIRY
464 (1996); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State
Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996) [hereinafter Ribstein & Kobayashi, Uniform State
Laws]. But see Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, The Non-Uniformity of Uniform
Laws, 35 J. CORP. L. 327 (2009) (showing that uniform lawmaking bodies can generate rules
that reflect special-interest biases).
73. Cf O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 18, at 16 (arguing that contractual choice-of-
law clauses serve this function).
74. See id. at ch. 4 (exploring state legal treatment of choice-of-law clauses).
75. Id. at ch. 6 (exploring state adherence to the internal affairs doctrine).
76. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1054 (4th ed. 2004) ("[O]ur
society, historically rooted in an agrarian economy reinforced by concepts of territorial sover-
eignty, has always placed a high emotional and protective value on land, identifying it with the
security of the person, family, and home. It is thus not surprising that the law of the situs of
land was early viewed as having the overwhelming if not exclusive claim to govern issues
related to land.").
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enable a state to garner reciprocal respect in future cases.77 Finally, states
can compete for residents, businesses, and other valuable assets not only
with desirable substantive rules but also by respecting reasonable choice-of-
law rules.
71
State choice-of-law coordination requires not only that states uniformly
adopt clear choice-of-law rules but also that these rules allocate lawmaking
authority in a way that provides parties with notice regarding what law
governs their conduct. Without such notice, parties must contend with the
possibility of multiple and conflicting laws. Thus, a choice-of-law rule that
clearly designates the applicable law based on facts that occur after a party
chooses a course of action may provide guidance for the court in litigation
but it does not adequately allocate regulatory authority.
In our examples of horizontal coordination,79 the states independently
chose to follow the governing choice-of-law rule. Our approach does not
depend on states explicitly agreeing with one another to follow a particular
rule that allocates state sovereign authority. Sometimes a state merely rec-
ognizes that another state has more compelling interests in regulating the
conduct. In addition, we have elsewhere explored the willingness of states to
apply other states' laws in order to attract and retain residents and thereby
serve the interests of politically powerful, "exit-affected" local groups. 80
Thus, state coordination is not random but the combined product of recog-
nized forces and pragmatic limits on states' jurisdictional reach. As a result,
coordination around a state choice-of-law rule indicates (though it doesn't
prove) a sensible allocation of sovereign authority.
Importantly, a preemption approach that takes into account horizontal
coordination might spur the states to further coordinate their choice-of-law
policies. If courts factored horizontal coordination into their approach to
preemption, they would bolster a process already inherent in federalism.
So far our discussion has focused on state formal coordination around a
single choice-of-law rule. Our approach also demands that any formal
choice-of-law system operate functionally to achieve horizontal coordina-
tion in a manner that contains costly spillovers. Functional noncoordination
may result where a choice-of-law rule achieves horizontal coordination in
most but not all cases to which the rule applies. In the residual cases, federal
vertical coordination may be necessary despite state coalescence around a
sensible choice-of-law rule. Consider, for example, the situs-based
choice-of-law rule as applied to nuisance actions. This rule was one of the
traditional choice-of-law rules put in place over a century ago,8 and despite
77. See, e.g., King v. Sarria, 69 N.Y 24 (1877) (discussing importance of reciprocity to
smooth international relations); cf Fales v. Comm'n on Licensure to Practice the Healing Art,
275 A.2d 238 (D.C. 1971) (noting that recognition of out-of-state professional licenses pro-
motes interstate reciprocity).
78. For an elaboration of this point, see O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 18, ch. 4.
79. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
80. See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 18, at 73-81.
81. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 76, at 1056-57 & n.2.
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a movement to other choice-of-law approaches by the overwhelming majori-
ty of states, the situs rule continues for real property." The situs rule makes
intuitive sense: it is clear where real property is situated, and the situs state
presumably has a predominant interest in the ownership and use of the
property. 3 Indeed, the Supreme Court once held that only the situs state has
subject matter jurisdiction to make determinations regarding title to proper-
ty.84
A situs rule for nuisance achieves formal coordination because the loca-
tion of the property effectively guarantees the application of one state's law.
In most cases, formal coordination also achieves functional coordination in
that it makes sense for the situs state to balance the competing interests re-
garding the maintenance and use of the land. However, the situs rule fails to
appropriately deal with harms that float across state borders. In those cases,
regulatory spillovers may justify a pro-preemption approach.
D. Federal Vertical Coordination
Of course, states' abilities to self-coordinate are limited. The federal
government can provide substitute coordination in at least three ways. First,
Congress can exercise its Commerce Clause or other constitutional authority
to supplant state substantive laws with uniform federal law.15 Although actu-
al displacement eliminates the benefits of state law, the threat of
congressional action can induce the states to coordinate on their own. Sec-
ond, Congress can impose a choice-of-law rule on the states. This solution
promotes state coordination without fully supplanting state regulatory au-
thority. Third, Congress can mandate the enforcement of choice-of-law and
choice-of-court clauses. These clauses enable parties to choose among vari-
ous procedural and substantive rules. Even where the states have failed to
coordinate their substantive laws or choice-of-law policies, party choice can
help clarify the governing legal rules for individual contracts. This Section
elaborates on the latter two coordinating mechanisms.
1. Federal Choice-of-Law Rules
Instead of replacing state substantive laws, Congress could preserve
state regulatory authority but coordinate it through federally created choice-
of-law rules. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution
requires each state to give "Full Faith and Credit" to the "public Acts, Rec-
ords, and judicial Proceedings" of other states and empowers Congress to
determine the effect each state must give to the laws of the other states.
8 6
82. Id. at 1056-57.
83. Id. at 1055.
84. Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105, 108 (1895).
85. The Supreme Court can do the same under the Dormant Commerce Clause. See
infra Section Il.A.
86. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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Congress could use this provision to induce horizontal coordination by im-
posing a nationwide approach to choosing governing laws.
Congress has ignored scholarly pleas to use its full faith and credit pow-
er to coordinate choice-of-law policies.87 This inaction can be explained on
political and policy grounds. Political groups tend to be interested in specific
substantive law issues rather than in choice of law. Thus, when addressing a
particular issue, Congress is more likely to federalize a substantive rule than
to impose a choice-of-law rule on the states. Moreover, an important ra-
tionale for federalism is to further democracy by bolstering the power of
local institutions (including interest groups) to address local concerns. 88
Congress is not as well positioned as the states to promote these local poli-
cies. Thus, in the limited situations in which Congress has employed a
choice-of-law approach, it has done so to promote national policy rather
than to coordinate state policymaking. For example, Congress enacted a
choice-of-law rule for usury legislation as applied to loans generated by na-
tional banks.8 9 Also, in enacting the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"),
Congress responded to the national debate on same-sex marriage by provid-
ing that states need not recognize same-sex marriages performed in other
states.90 Congress thus promoted its view of national policy rather than try-
ing to achieve effective horizontal coordination of conflicting state policies.
We are unaware of any congressional bill seeking to comprehensively legis-
late on choice-of-law rules.9'
87. See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 69; Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice of Law
for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1623, 1636-37 (1992).
88. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MicH. L. REV. 395, 427, 441 (1989) (arguing that federalism
values further responsiveness to distinctive local concerns).
89. See infra Section IV.D.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) (providing that "[n]o State ... shall be required to give
effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State ... respecting a rela-
tionship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State .... ").
91. In contrast, recently enacted European Union ("EU") laws contain a number of
choice-of-law rules to be uniformly applied by the member nations. See, e.g., Regulation (EC)
No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 17, 2008 on the Law
applicable to contractual obligations [hereinafter Rome 1], 0. J. EU L 177/6 of July 4, 2008;
Regulation (EC) 864/2007, on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations [hereinaf-
ter Rome II], 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40; Council Regulation (EU) 1259/2010, Implementing
Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Law Applicable to Divorce and Legal Separation
[hereinafter Rome III], 2010 O.J. (L 343) 10. Unlike Rome I and H, Rome III does not bind all
EU member nations, and so far only fourteen member nations have expressed a willingness to
cooperate on choice of law in this area. For a report and relevant documentation, see Giorgio
Buono, Rome III Reg.: Council Adopts Decision Authorising Enhanced Cooperation on the





2. Federal Enforcement of Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Court Clauses
If federal choice-of-law rules are infeasible, Congress might instead fo-
cus on coordinating sovereign authority in cases where the parties
contracted for a particular governing law or court to resolve disputes.
Allowing parties to contract for their own governing law promotes clarity
and eliminates the problem of multiple applicable laws. However, a federal
statute enforcing choice-of-law clauses would require Congress to grapple
with a number of difficult policy questions, including the extent to which
these clauses should be enforced in contracts of adhesion, the circumstances
under which enforcement harms third parties, and whether the clauses
should be enforced where the chosen law invalidates all or part of the con-
tract.92 Even if Congress could be induced to undertake this project, the
results would not necessarily be better than current state approaches to en-
forcing choice-of-law clauses.
We have elsewhere proposed a federal statute that would enable Con-
gress to promote choice while deferring to state law on these difficult policy
questions. Specifically, our proposal would require states to enforce choice-
of-law clauses except where enforcement is inconsistent with a state statute
that protects a contracting party who resides in the state. 93 Our proposed
federal statute would help states coordinate their regulatory authority over
commercial relations without restricting their ability to experiment with
substantive regulations. Moreover, a general choice-of-law statute like the
one we have proposed is less likely to be infected by the political
considerations that can influence statutes addressing a particular issue, such
as same-sex marriage, and is therefore more likely to sensibly allocate state
power. On the other hand, the relative absence of interest-group engagement
makes it less likely that Congress will be moved to enact such a statute.
Choice-of-court clauses also can help parties avoid uncertainty regarding
the legal rules that govern their conduct. When suit can be brought in multi-
ple states' courts and those courts apply nonuniform choice-of-law rules and
nonuniform procedural rules, the likely outcome of a claim will depend on
the forum in which it is ultimately resolved. Consider, for example, disputes
involving noncompete clauses in employment contracts. When an employee
in state A leaves her firm to work for a competitor in state B, each party
might be tempted to file suit in a different state court. The employee and
new employer might sue for declaratory judgment in their local state B
court, especially if state B restricts enforcement of noncompete clauses. In
92. See generally BRILMAYER ET AL., supra note 70, ch. 8 (materials demonstrating that
these issues are important considerations relevant to enforcement of choice-of-law clauses).
We are confident that Congress will continue to avoid answering these questions because
Congress has so far abstained from addressing comparable issues as they arise in the context
of enforcement of arbitration clauses under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").
93. See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 18, at 206-15; see also Henry N. Butler &
Larry E. Ribstein, A Single-License Approach to Regulating Insurance 14-20 (Univ. of Ill.
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. LE08-015, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
1134792 (proposing a similar statute for insurance law).
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contrast, the former employer might sue for breach of contract in its local
state A court, especially if state A tends to enforce noncompete clauses. In
this case, with multiple forums chosen, the parties' legal rights and obliga-
tions would depend on who wins a race to judgment. 94
A federal statute requiring state courts to enforce contractual choice-of-
court clauses could minimize litigation gamesmanship. However, as with
choice-of-law clauses, Congress would be forced to grapple with a number
of policy issues regarding the extent to which these clauses could harm a
contracting or third party. 95 Also, Congress's constitutional authority to reg-
ulate choice-of-court clauses is at least slightly more limited than its explicit
Full Faith and Credit Clause authority to regulate state choice-of-law poli-
cies. Presumably, Congress would have to enforce forum choice under its
Commerce Clause authority, and the substantive scope of the Commerce
Clause is narrower than that of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.96
The federal government has found other ways to encourage enforcement
of choice-of-court clauses, however. The Supreme Court has strongly en-
dorsed choice-of-court clauses in its federal admiralty law cases, which,
although not binding on the states, probably have encouraged greater en-
forcement by state courts of choice-of-court clauses in other contexts. For
example, in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., the Court mandated en-
forcement of a choice-of-court clause based on a strong federal policy to
strengthen the United States' international competitive position:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encour-
aged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept
that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts .... We
cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our
courts.
9 7
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute extended this reasoning to a con-
sumer contract contained within a passenger cruise line ticket.9" Both
admiralty cases involved businesses whose ships touched many jurisdic-
tions, speaking to a need for coherent regulatory coordination.
Federal courts have also facilitated the enforcement of choice-of-court
agreements by creatively exercising their removal power in federal diversi-
ty cases. The Supreme Court held in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp. that federal law applies in a motion to transfer a diversity case to a
94. A similar situation arose in Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 73 (Ct. App. 1998).
95. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 76, ch. 8. The fact that Congress continues to refuse
to address such issues as they arise under the FAA provides evidence that Congress would
likely remain inactive here too.
96. Congress can address any topic under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but its au-
thority under the Commerce Clause is limited to issues affecting interstate commerce.
97. 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
98. 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991).
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different federal court.99 This case may signal a more tolerant approach by
federal courts to choice-of-court clauses.100 The Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"),"0 1 discussed in more detail below in Part IV, also authorizes con-
tracting parties to choose an arbitral forum in which to resolve their
disputes. It is likely that this indirectly affects enforcement of choice-of-
court clauses because once parties can opt out of courts altogether, it seems
more reasonable to permit them to choose the courts of another state. °2
International law soon may require member states to enforce choice-of-
court agreements. Article 5(1) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements provides that "[t]he court or courts of a Contracting State des-
ignated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall have jurisdiction to
decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless the agreement is
null and void under the law of that State."'013 If the United States ratifies the
agreement,'0 4 Congress would then need to enact federal law analogous to
the Federal Arbitration Act mandating enforcement of choice-of-court
clauses. Note that the same international commercial pressures that influ-
enced the Court in The Bremen are at play in the Hague Convention
negotiations.
E. Resolving Preemption Questions
So far we have illustrated the role that horizontal choice-of-law coordi-
nation can play in maximizing the benefits of state law and in alleviating the
necessity that state law be replaced with federal law. Horizontal coordina-
tion therefore can be an important determinant in preemption analysis.
Preemption questions can be resolved by some combination of action by
Congress, administrative agencies, and courts. Although the rest of this Arti-
cle focuses principally on judicial resolution of preemption issues, our
99. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
100. The Stewart Court did not go so far as to state that the strong presumption of en-
forceability announced in Bremen and Shute applies in the context of transfer motions.
Instead, transfer motions are subject to their own standard. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29-32. In a
concurring opinion, two justices stated a preference that the strong presumption carry over to
consideration of transfer motions. Id. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring). For an excellent discus-
sion of the issue, see Ryan T. Holt, Note, A Uniform System for the Enforceability of Forum
Selection Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1913 (2009).
101. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
102. See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 18, at 106.
103. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art. 5(1), June 30, 2005, 44
I.L.M. 1294, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98.
104. The Hague Convention takes force if two member nations ratify it. Id. at art. 31. To
date, only Mexico has ratified the Convention, but both the United States and the European
Union have signed it. See Status Table: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court
Agreements, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L L., http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=
conventions.status&cid=98 (last updated Nov. 11, 2010). Ratification by the United States
would give the Convention force and thus obligate the United States to generate domestic laws
that comply with it.
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analysis touches on both congressional carve-outs and agency preemption
determinations. Each is briefly described in this Section.
1. Carve-Out and Savings Clauses
When Congress clearly intends to displace particular types of state laws,
it can express that intent with a preemption clause. For example, in address-
ing motor vehicle emissions, section 209 of the Federal Clean Air Act
provides as follows:
No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to en-
force any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part. No State shall
require certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to the con-
trol of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine
as condition precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registra-
tion of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment." 5
When Congress intends to create federal law that will coexist with state
laws, it can place a savings clause into the legislation. For example, section
24(a) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act makes clear
that Congress did not intend its regulation to displace state pesticide regula-
tion that is more restrictive than the federal regulation:
A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or
device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not
permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter."
One type of savings clause is a carve-out that federalizes the portion of a
legal area that most needs coordination while leaving the rest of the field for
state regulation. An important example of this limited approach to federal
coordination is in the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
("SLUSA"). An earlier federal law, the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act ("PSLRA"), had restricted federal securities class actions by imposing
pleading and other requirements on cases brought under the federal securi-
ties laws. 10 7 Plaintiffs circumvented these restrictions by bringing state court
suits under state securities laws. 08 Congress then enacted SLUSA to elimi-
nate state securities law class actions based on untrue statements, omissions
of material fact, or the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contriv-
ances.'0 9 At the same time, however, SLUSA also included the so-called
"Delaware carve-out," which preserved state securities claims where those
claims were based on the law of the state of the issuer's incorporation and
105. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006).
106. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2006).
107. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2006)).
108. H.R. Rep. No. 105-640, at 10 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(1) (2006).
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generally touched on corporate internal governance. 10 The Delaware carve-
out preserved state laws in an area where the states have effectively achieved
horizontal coordination on their own. By choosing the place of incorporation,
incorporating shareholders are able to choose the rules that will determine
their rights, and future shareholders can price the company's securities
based on those rights. In contrast, pre-SLUSA state securities laws often
protected resident shareholders of foreign corporations and so potentially
subjected corporate actors to multiple states' securities laws. SLUSA pro-
vided for coordination by preserving only those state securities class actions
based on the law of the state of incorporation. In Section IV.A, we apply this
analysis to the preemptive scope of SLUSA provisions.
Although carve-outs may be effective in some circumstances, Congress
has rarely employed this nuanced approach. It has done so only when the
carve-out has strong national interest-group backing, such as the corporate
managers and lawyers supporting nonpreemption of Delaware corporation
law. Accordingly, it is necessary to look outside of Congress for detailed
approaches to preemption issues.
2. Administrative Agencies
It is extremely difficult to perfectly balance nationwide coordination of
regulatory authority with the preservation of state sovereignty. The balance
requires consideration of a complex set of factors, and reasonable minds can
disagree about whether more coordination or more state sovereignty is pref-
erable at the margins. In addition, state lawmaking is a dynamic process and
states can achieve greater or lesser horizontal coordination over time. Con-
gress might displace state laws when horizontal coordination is lacking only
to find later that state coordination over similar nondisplaced issues has im-
proved due to legal or economic changes. Conversely, Congress might
refrain from displacing state law when horizontal coordination is present or
promising, only to later find that such coordination has dissipated.'
Administrative agencies might be best suited to consider the dynamic
nature of horizontal coordination. For example, Congress could enact a stat-
ute that is clear as to a federal objective yet unclear as to its preemptive
scope and then delegate authority to an administrative agency to make
preemption determinations in light of the degree of horizontal coordination
over time. Although agencies sometimes perform this role even without spe-
cific congressional delegation," 2 there is scholarly disagreement over the
degree to which it makes sense to house preemption determinations within
agencies. Some argue that agencies are structured to provide expertise in
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(d)(1), 78bb(f)(3)(a).
11. This may have happened in a number of areas with the "choice-of-law" revolution
during the 1960s and 1970s, when the states moved from troubled but somewhat uniform
choice-of-law rules to a number of mostly standard-based approaches to choice of law. See
generally BRILMAYER ET AL., supra note 70, ch. 2 (exploring various modem approaches to
choice of law that developed during this timeframe).
112. See Bressman, supra note 9, at 614-16; see also Sharkey, supra note 56, at 544-45.
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specific subject areas and are therefore poorly suited to evaluate larger struc-
tural issues like promoting a healthy federalism.' 3 Others argue that
agencies are relatively well equipped to represent state interests, 1 4 deliber-
ate effectively in an environment of accountability," 5 and bring substantive
expertise to bear on the preemption question."
16
Our approach offers a new argument for why preemption decisions are
sometimes best left to agencies: agencies have an institutional comparative
advantage in their ability to monitor changes in state horizontal coordination
and to make reversible determinations' ' 7 on whether preemption of state law
seems appropriate. By leaving flexible the extent to which federal law will
ultimately displace state law, Congress's use of federal administrative moni-
toring can motivate the states to continue to coordinate in order to avoid
federal preemption.
To be sure, self-interested executive agencies may be too inclined to-
ward preemption because preemption aggrandizes agency authority."1
8
However, executive, congressional, and judicial oversight can help temper
these effects."19 In any event, although our theory provides a basis for action
by administrative agencies, it does not preclude other considerations that
might suggest otherwise.
In short, although Congress and administrative agencies can provide
some help in resolving preemption issues, they have rarely done so. The
judiciary is the only branch of the federal government that regularly ad-
dresses the scope of preemption. The next Part considers how the judiciary
may play a more effective role by explicitly recognizing regulatory coordi-
nation as a basis for resolving preemption issues.
113. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 741-42
(2004); Brief of the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Laws,
Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 23, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009)
(No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851615.
114. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 58
DUKE L.J. 2125, 2127-28 (2009).
115. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 2008-10 (2008).
116. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023,
2082-83 (2008).
117. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 115, at 1990 ("[T]here is little mechanism in the
legislative branch for ongoing reevaluation of a policy, and the very high costs of legislative
change decrease the likelihood that Congress will respond definitively to new events.").
118. Cf WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT 36-42 (1971) (discussing agency aggrandizement).
119. See Bressman, supra note 9, at 569-71 (discussing congressional oversight strate-
gies); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125




III. A CHOICE-OF-LAW COORDINATION APPROACH TO PREEMPTION
This Part links the first two Parts of this Article by showing how and
when horizontal regulatory coordination can provide an appropriate policy
basis for determining the preemptive effect of federal laws. Specifically, we
argue that preemption decisions should lean toward invalidation of overlap-
ping state legislation where the states have failed to achieve horizontal
coordination as described in Section I.B. Conversely, preemption decisions
should lean toward respecting state sovereignty where the states have coor-
dinated or shown substantial promise or progress toward coordination
through choice-of-law policies or otherwise. Other factors can swamp the
importance of horizontal regulatory coordination, but its presence or ab-
sence can provide needed guidance for the preemption determination.
Our contribution is to identify an important yet previously unaddressed
structural factor that should play a role in preemption decisions. The Su-
premacy Clause promotes federal authority, including Congress's
Commerce Clause power to create and maintain a national market. Because
this market may be jeopardized by the states' failure to horizontally coordi-
nate, courts should take into account the degree to which the states can or
have coordinated the allocation of their sovereign authority over the legal
issue involved. We believe that our inquiry would promote a healthy
federalism, an important consideration underlying the Supremacy Clause.
Moreover, encouraging courts to ground preemption decisions on factors
that promote a healthy federalism enables them to avoid making opaque
policy decisions masquerading as determinations of congressional intent.
A key aspect of our approach is that it factors choice of law into
preemption analysis. The degree of state horizontal coordination most often
turns on the nature of the choice-of-law rules applied by the states. State
sovereignty should be preserved where the state choice-of-law rules relating
to the question at hand provide formal and functional horizontal coordina-
tion. On the other hand, displacement of state laws makes more sense in the
presence of costly regulatory spillovers. Although it is often impossible to
objectively determine the appropriate degree of regulation, states' willing-
ness to sensibly allocate their sovereign authority over such questions
indicates their acceptance of the diversity of state laws. In identifying the
choice-of-law coordination factor, we hope to improve the analysis in some
types of preemption cases, which now rest on conflicting, overly broad, and
not fully apt presumptions.
Before detailing our approach, two caveats are in order. First, we do not
propose an exclusive approach to preemption. We simply argue that the de-
gree of state choice-of-law coordination can in many cases be a relevant,
important, or dispositive factor in making a preemption determination. Our
approach can work side by side with other theories of preemption, and is
more important in some types of cases than in others. Factors other than
horizontal coordination should at times also be considered, and they may
eclipse the importance of coordination to the preemption decision.
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Second, we do not purport to place our proposal in the context of consti-
tutional theories. Rather, we build on the federalist structure of government
and the role that the Supremacy Clause can play in promoting a strong bal-
ance between state and federal government. We hope we can persuade
general constitutional theorists to reconcile our approach with their theories,
but we leave that exercise for another day.
Section HI.A places the preemption inquiry alongside constitutional
provisions that, with the Supremacy Clause, help to coordinate sovereign
authority both vertically and horizontally. Section III.B contrasts our regula-
tory coordination approach with other proposed theories of preemption.
Section III.C compares our approach to the preemption presumptions dis-
cussed in Part I.
A. Preemption's Coordinating Role
Regulatory coordination is a general principle for allocating power
among the states and between the state and federal governments, and there-
fore it appropriately informs the constitutional provisions that support our
federal system. Preemption decisions are made under the Supremacy
Clause, but those decisions work in conjunction with other constitutional
provisions designed to help coordinate regulatory authority in our federal
system. These include the federal government's "umpire" role under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, Congress's affirmative power to act under the
Commerce Clause, and the courts' power to declare state laws unconstitu-
tional under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The Constitution's most specific statement that the federal government
should play a role in coordinating the reach of state laws is contained in the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, which promotes horizontal coordination in two
ways. First, under the Clause, each state must give effect to sister-state
"public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings.""12 On its face, the Clause
seems to require each state to fully enforce other states' laws. According to
Justice Robert Jackson, the Clause can guard against "the disintegrating in-
fluence of provincialism in jurisprudence, but without aggrandizement of
federal power at the expense of the states."'' In practice, however, the Su-
preme Court has done little under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to insist
that state choice-of-law rules promote horizontal regulatory coordination. 22
Second, the Clause explicitly empowers Congress to enact general laws
that "prescribe ... the Effect" of states' acts, records, and proceedings.' 23
Based on this language, Congress could (but rarely does) enact laws regulat-
ing choice of law. The main contemporary example is the Defense of
120. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
121. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitu-
tion, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1945).
122. Daniel J. Dorward, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial Protec-
tion of Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON.
L. 141, 167 (1998).
123. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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Marriage Act. 124 Perhaps Congress's reluctance to more effectively allocate
state sovereign authority is not surprising. Congressional representatives
may be unwilling to incur the political costs of invading the turf of locally
entrenched interest groups even if federal law could help contain
spillovers. 125 More importantly, if interest groups are sufficiently strong to
mobilize Congress to act, the resulting legislation is more likely to federal-
ize substantive law than to impose rules designed to encourage more
effective state regulatory authority.
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."'126 This power enables Congress to deal with horizontal coordination
problems that might hinder the creation of an efficient national market. In
fact, courts tend to focus directly on horizontal coordination under the
Dormant Commerce Clause, which invalidates state regulation of interstate
commerce in some situations. 27 The Court has struck down state regulation
that effectively governs out-of-state business activities. Examples include
state regulation of the length of interstate trains'28 and trucks 129 and the
shape of truck mudguards. 13 Such regulations effectively forced interstate
transportation companies either to make costly changes when crossing state
lines or to comply with the most onerous state regulations for all interstate
activities. In these cases, state laws inappropriately spilled over into other
states.
Although horizontal coordination can and does play a legitimate role in
the Supreme Court's Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, horizontal
coordination concerns are important enough in our scheme of federalism
that there is a role for coordination analysis elsewhere in our constitutional
structure. Surely, horizontal coordination is not relevant only before Con-
gress has acted. Preemption and Dormant Commerce Clause cases represent
two situations where the courts can facilitate horizontal coordination in the
face of congressional silence on state authority to regulate.
To illustrate the point, consider the case of H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
Mond."' In Hood, the Court struck down the New York Commissioner of
Agriculture and Markets's decision to deny a dairy company a license to
establish and operate a fourth milk plant in New York for the purpose of
124. See supra text accompanying note 90.
125. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REv.
265, 270-90 (1990) (discussing Congress's political calculus in deciding whether to enact
statutes that invade areas in which states have exercised lawmaking authority).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
127. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189, 195, 204-06, 209-11
(1824).
128. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 771 (1945).
129. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 674-79 (1981); Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,446-48 (1978).
130. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959).
131. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
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exporting milk to Massachusetts. 3 2 New York justified its denial on the
ground that granting the application could lead to ruinous competition given
the state's milk supply shortage.'33 The Court concluded that New York's
actions impermissibly interfered with interstate commerce because the state
had hindered the interstate transfer of milk in favor of protecting the inter-
ests of local buyers.'34 In response to this finding, New York argued that the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act ("AMAA"), a federal law, specifical-
ly authorized the state's actions. 35 New York argued that its licensing
scheme, as applied, was constitutionally permissible because it "coincides
with, supplements and is part of the federal regulatory scheme,"'136 but the
Court ultimately concluded that the AMAA did not authorize the state's ac-
tions. '
Suppose, however, that the case had come to the Court as a preemption
case. The dairy company would have argued that the state scheme was in-
consistent with the AMAA and was therefore preempted. Despite some
potential tension between the two schemes, the AMAA did not actually con-
flict with the state law at issue, and, under the Supreme Court's presumption
regarding traditional areas of state regulation, the state scheme might have
been held valid.
Note that if the case can be decided on the basis of preemption, then the
Court would have needed to tether its decision to an actual congressional
statute. Congress's enactment of a law represents an implicit political judg-
ment that the benefit to national interest groups outweighs the cost of some
potential intrusion on state sovereignty, even if the statute fails to specify
exactly how much intrusion is contemplated. By using the Dormant Com-
merce Clause instead of preemption doctrine, the Court is able to invalidate
state laws without any statement of congressional policy that could be con-
strued as favoring vertical regulatory coordination, and the legitimacy of its
decisions therefore is less clear. In our view, state laws disciplined by hori-
zontal coordination should survive constitutional scrutiny under both the
Dormant Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause, unless displacing
state law is necessary in order to promote some other federal policy.
B. Regulatory Coordination and Preemption Theories
We are not the first to propose preemption analyses that might help
courts fill gaps in legislative intent. This Section briefly compares our ap-
proach to other recently proposed preemption analyses. Some commentators
have proposed political theories of preemption designed to ensure that exer-
cises of federal preemptive power ultimately reflect the public will. These
132. Hood, 336 U.S. at 528-29, 545.
133. Id. at 528-29.
134. Id. at 537-39.
135. ld. at 540-41.
136. Id. at 540.
137. Id. at 544-45.
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theories do not attempt to distinguish situations according to the need for
federal action. Others have argued that preemption doctrine should be used
to create uniform substantive law, either for its own sake or to promote a
national market. These theories recognize the potential problems caused by
state spillovers. However, they do not allow for the value of diverse state
laws and the potential for choice-of-law rules to constrain the excesses of
state law and promote a healthy federalism.
1. Political Theories of Preemption
Some scholars have incorporated theories of politics into their theories
of preemption. For example, David Dana has proposed focusing on "demo-
cratic preferences expressed through representative state institutions," '138
particularly where congressional intent is uncertain. 39 In deciding whether
to preempt, Dana would take into account "the weight of democratic support
for the kind of state law or laws at issue." 140 Thus, a California law
outweighs one in Rhode Island, and a type of law adopted "by states that
account for half of the nation's population has more democratic weight than
a measure adopted by states that account for one tenth of the nation's popu-
lation.""'a In particular, Dana argues for nonpreemption by the Clean Air Act
of California's stricter fuel economy standards, which are now applied in
several other states, consistent with a National Highway and Traffic Safety
Administration ("NHTSA") ruling. 142
Dana's approach fails to take into account the benefits of state sover-
eignty in contributing to a healthy federalism. What matters for Dana is not
state diversity but the extent to which the states have endorsed a single legal
approach. 143 Federalism, however, is not just a matter of counting votes.
Federalism can protect democratic values not only by enabling parties to
express political voice but also by enabling parties with diverse interests and
needs to gravitate toward laws that better suit their activities.
The following example demonstrates the primary difference between
Dana's theory and ours. Suppose that only a few small states such as Dela-
ware apply specific business association rules but that all states have
adopted a uniform choice-of-law rule such as the internal affairs doctrine. 144
Next assume that a federal law overlaps with the small states' business asso-





142. Id. at 532-35.
143. Id. at 527-32.
144. An example of a specific business association rule would be an antitakeover statute.
See Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption as Micromanagement, 65 Bus. LAW. 789 (2010) (discuss-
ing whether the Delaware antitakeover statute should be preempted by federal antitakeover
law).
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ciation rules. 145 Dana presumably would support preemption in this circum-
stance because, as represented by the population in each state promulgating
business association rules, only a tiny fraction of the nation's population
politically supports the alternative laws. By contrast, we would oppose
preemption as unnecessary because the states have achieved horizontal co-
ordination of their differing substantive rules through uniformly applied
choice-of-law rules.
In addition to helping preserve a healthy federalism, our approach might
promote democratic values as well as or better than Dana's approach. Each
state's willingness to enforce other states' laws within its own borders
should provide the general democratic approval Dana is seeking. And our
approach can enable those constituents whose voices are not well
represented in a given state's legislature to choose rules from states where
their interests are better represented.
In contrast, other commentators have proposed preemption theories that
emphasize the role of interest groups. For example, Roderick Hills opposes
preemption where congressional intent is unclear as the best way to provoke
Congress to more clearly state the circumstances under which it prefers
preemption.'46 Hills reasons that strong business groups usually favor a
strong presumption in favor of preemption and can effectively lobby for it in
Congress. 147 He responds to commentators such as Alan Schwartz148 who
favor preemption as a mechanism for overcoming Congress's political iner-
tia in responding to coordination problems.
Interest group-based theories of preemption do not take account of the
value of state diversity and states' ability to coordinate sufficiently to over-
come spillover problems. Nor do they recognize that Congress may fail to
address preemption for both good and bad reasons. For example, the states'
ability to coordinate around a choice-of-law rule suggests the existence of a
political equilibrium that may be particularly difficult to defeat in Congress,
because clear choice-of-law rules often enable some states to specialize in
the production of laws in that area.'49 Schwartz's approach therefore could
lead to preemption where congressional inertia reflects the fact that the
states have horizontally coordinated. And Hills' approach would produce
too little preemption when powerful interests are pitted against one another,
a circumstance that might indicate that effective horizontal choice-of-law
coordination is not feasible.
145. Preemption of the Delaware antitakeover law is discussed infra in note 184 and
accompanying text.
146. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the Na-
tional Legislative Process, 82 N.YU. L. REV. 1, 17 (2007).
147. Id. at 29-32.
148. See Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulato-
ry Compliance Defense, 2 AM. L. & EcON. REV. 1 (2000).




In any event, one benefit to not offering an all-encompassing solution to
preemption is that our approach could operate alongside interest-group theo-
ries. For example, the political benefits of Hill's approach could be
combined with the policy considerations underlying our approach by de-
manding a clear preemption statement only in situations where the states
have achieved choice-of-law coordination. Our approach also can accom-
modate Schwartz's concern about inadequate preemption as a result of
congressional inertia because it would place a lower burden on congression-
al action where uncoordinated states create a compelling need for
preemption. Conversely, our approach encourages the states to coordinate
when feasible in order to avoid or minimize the extent of federal preemp-
tion. "5
2. Preemption to Promote Uniformity
Some commentators explicitly take account of the coordination benefits
of preemption by arguing that preemption should reflect the federal interest
under the Commerce Clause in providing uniform substantive laws. For ex-
ample, according to Viet Dinh, Dormant Commerce Clause analysis
supports "a uniquely federal interest in maintaining national unity and uni-
formity in interstate economic regulation," and that interest is also relevant
to preemption when federal legislation has "a general purpose to further the
constitutional values of national cohesion and economic uniformity."'' 5 Sim-
ilarly, Thomas Merrill recognizes that preemption may involve a judgment
about whether federal law needs to operate exclusively in order to protect
the interest in "maintaining a single national market."'15 2 Both authors as-
sume that uniform substantive legal rules are necessary to promote national
markets.'53
Our horizontal coordination approach also promotes national markets
and coherent legal rules, but we emphasize other possible ways to achieve
these goals. If uniformity were an end in itself, then federal law would al-
most always be the most effective lawmaking vehicle. It would follow that
courts should generally, if not always, presume in favor of preempting state
law where legislative intent is unclear. However, uniformity is only a means
to an end. Where clarity in the rules that apply to particular conduct is the
objective, there are means other than uniformity and federalization that
might be effective. Importantly, these less drastic means enable the preserva-
tion of the benefits of state sovereignty, including the provision of
150. This is similar to the effect of the Supreme Court's acceptance of federal common
law in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which spurred the states to embrace uniform
state laws. This history is traced in Ribstein & Kobayashi, Uniform State Laws, supra note 72.
151. Dinh, supra note 1, at2110-l.
152. Merrill, supra note 7, at 743.
153. Issacharoff and Sharkey, supra note 20, also focus on national market exigencies,
but their analysis is more nuanced and less categorical than those of Dinh and Merrill. Howev-
er, as mentioned earlier, see supra note 65 and accompanying text, they too overlook the
importance of considering horizontal coordination on choice of law.
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laboratories of experimentation, the possibility of jurisdictional competition,
and the ability of parties to better fulfill their diverse needs. When states
have effectively coordinated themselves, preemption is justified only to
achieve a particular national policy.
Like us, Robert Schapiro explicitly recognizes the potential of preemp-
tion doctrine to help discipline state spillovers.154 However, to the extent that
he recognizes a spillover problem, Schapiro proposes solutions designed to
achieve substantive uniformity across the states.155 In its extreme form,
Schapiro's theory would destroy state legal diversity in the process of con-
taining state spillovers. His mistake, like those of Dinh and Merrill, is to
assume that only substantive uniformity can achieve coordination. Again,
other coordination mechanisms, particularly choice-of-law rules, can ad-
dress spillovers while preserving the state market for laws.
In short, we advocate that courts unpack claims about the desirability of
"uniform" substantive rules to distiguish situations in which uniformity is
serving the value of providing clarity regarding the governing legal stand-
ard. In these situations, we suggest that courts consider whether this clarity
is, or realistically can be, achieved through choice-of-law coordination
while preserving the benefits of state sovereignty.
C. Reexamining Preemption Presumptions
This Section compares our choice-of-law coordination approach to the
currently employed preemption presumptions discussed above. 156 We have
shown how courts apply these presumptions inconsistently and in a way that
likely obfuscates behind-the-scenes policy judgments. We offer an alterna-
tive horizontal coordination approach that can operate as a relevant factor
rather than an across-the-board presumption. This approach is more trans-
parent and conceptually consistent than the presumption approach because it
is clearly tethered to a structural commitment to a "healthy federalism."
A basic problem with preemption analysis is that it tends to allocate an
area of law either to the state or federal domain. There is nothing inherently
"state-like" or "federal-like" about most areas of law. Federal and state laws
both occupy many substantive legal areas and the balance between the two
shifts over time, with a general tendency toward increasing federalization.
Robust federalism demands that the courts protect against shifts that disrupt
the appropriate allocation of power between federal and state government
rather than adopting policies that fuel such trends irrespective of the wishes
of Congress. Also, coherently filling gaps in legislative intent demands doc-
trines that do not require a binary categorization of each legal subject area as
154. See Robert A. Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 811, 824-29
(2008).
155. See id. at 829.
156. See supra Section III.B.
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either exclusively federal or as left to the states. 157 Regulatory coordination
provides a basis for such doctrine.
Consider, for example, the presumption against preemption when Con-
gress acts in an area that is traditionally left to the states. This presumption
reaches correct results under our theory where the states have not only tradi-
tionally regulated in an area but also have effectively coordinated through
choice-of-law rules to mitigate spillovers. Examples include the corporate
internal affairs doctrine and the real property situs rule. In both of those
situations, federal law is unnecessary to provide clarity regarding the gov-
erning rules, and that fact provides a reason to interpret narrowly the
preemptive reach of federal law.
In contrast, consider tort law, which is also typically left to the states.
Here the states have done a poor job of coordinating. Some states tend to
choose the law of the place of injury, some choose the law of the parties'
residence, and some choose the law of the forum.'58 A defendant therefore
could be subject to the tort laws of multiple states for a single action and
have little notice at the time of engaging in conduct as to which law will
apply in future proceedings. 5 9 This results in the types of regulatory spillo-
vers that federal law can appropriately address. Congress has left much of
tort law to the states not because federal law is somehow inherently inap-
propriate but for other reasons-perhaps because of inertia resulting from
the clash of powerful interest groups. Where Congress does act, regulatory
coordination considerations might justify using preemption to more broadly
interpret the displacement of state law. Accordingly, our approach suggests
different results depending on the legal area.
Field preemption, or the presumption in favor of preemption where fed-
eral regulation has pervasively regulated a field, is similarly overbroad.
When Congress attempts to occupy a field, a court should not assume it is
therefore appropriate to interpret such federal statutes as eliminating state
regulatory authority to the greatest extent possible. Instead, courts should
ask whether preemption in a given case would promote a congressional de-
sire to impose a particular rule or instead a need to coordinate governing
rules. If the latter arguably motivates Congress, then state horizontal coordi-
nation, if feasible, would be superior to vertical coordination. A particular
danger of an overly broad field preemption doctrine is that when states ex-
pect courts to apply field preemption to a particular problem, they might
157. See Schapiro, supra note 154, at 815-17 ("Dual federalism, the idea that the states
and the national government enjoy exclusive and non-overlapping regulatory domains, no
longer holds sway on the United States Supreme Court.").
158. For a discussion of the varying approaches used by the states to resolve choice-of-
law issues in tort suits, see generally EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 688-755
(3d ed. 2000).
159. Of course, it is possible that the states could coordinate on a choice-of-law rule that
does not provide ex ante notice as, for example, when the states coordinated around a place-
of-injury rule under the First Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 377 (1934). In either case, horizontal coordination fails to provide a basis for leaving the
substantive law to the states.
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refrain from efficient lawmaking, including efforts to solve coordination
problems.16 0
The extensive corporate governance provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 16' illustrate these field preemp-
tion difficulties. The Act might suggest to courts that Congress intends to
occupy the field of corporate governance. Since corporate governance is
traditionally a state matter, the field preemption presumption would conflict
with the state law nonpreemption presumption. Aside from this problem of
conflicting presumptions,162 the potential role of field preemption ignores
the states' horizontal coordination through the internal affairs doctrine,
which counsels against preemption. Applying field preemption perversely
encourages a creep toward federalization rather than respect for the states'
ability to self-coordinate consistent with a healthy federalism. In this situa-
tion, our approach to preemption would demand evidence of clear
congressional intent to preempt.
It is important to clarify the relationship between our approach and con-
gressional intent. We do not seek to override congressional intent. Whether
or not regulatory coordination justifies preemption, a court should find that
federal law preempts state law whenever preemption would further congres-
sional intent. Moreover, although our approach is designed to apply when
congressional intent is unclear, it is not based on a theory of legislative in-
tent. Instead, our approach advocates a judicially imposed gap-filling policy
justified by preemption's role in helping to promote a healthy federalism.
Consequently, even if Congress indicated no intent to preempt state law or
achieve horizontal coordination, preemption nevertheless might be appro-
priate to achieve this coordination. Our approach promotes transparency by
asking courts to consider our policy basis for their determinations instead of
falsely claiming to glean legislative intent.
Regulatory coordination can also help to clarify existing doctrine, as il-
lustrated by reexamining the Florida Lime and Jones cases discussed
earlier. 163 Both cases involved California food products regulations that were
more stringent than applicable federal regulations; one required avocados
sold in the state to have a minimum oil content, 164 and the other required
that flour sold in the state weigh at least as much as the amount stated on the
package. 65 Both state regulations applied to intrastate sales that are tradi-
tionally within the province of state law and therefore arguably justify a
presumption against preemption under current doctrine. Yet Florida Lime
160. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and
Corporate Banknptcy, 72 TEx. L. REv. 471, 489-90 (1994) (discussing how federal law has
caused systemic neglect of state insolvency law).
161. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
162. See supra Part 1.
163. See supra Part I.
164. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 133 (1963).
165. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
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upheld the state regulation 6 6 while Jones struck it down, 167 in both cases
over dissenting opinions.
Our approach helps rationalize these results. Florida Lime was con-
sistent with choice-of-law coordination because whatever one thinks of
California's rule, it applied only to sales within California. Avocado sellers
easily could avoid the California rule simply by not selling in California.
California therefore could experiment with its regulatory approach while not
imposing costs on a national market. Importantly, Florida Lime was decided
in 1963, before the predominance of national distribution chains for
produce.' 68 In that environment, each state could enact regulations that ap-
plied only to sales within the state, and the benefits of state law could be
preserved without hindering parties' ability to determine what law applied
to their conduct or to comply with applicable law.
By contrast, the California regulation in Jones, decided a few years after
Florida Lime, effectively hindered the then-existing national market for
flour. Because many companies could not cheaply tailor the products or
labels on products offered for sale in individual states, 69 California's regula-
tions would have forced companies to change their product labeling or the
amount of flour provided in each lot across the United States. 170 Moreover,
California's regulations would have forced interstate sellers to overpack in
order to take into account interstate variations in humidity.17" ' Spillover ef-
fects justified giving a broader scope to the federal regulation in Jones than
the one in Florida Lime.
Jones and Florida Lime are harder cases to evaluate under our approach
than are cases involving the internal affairs or situs rules. As with those
rules, states achieve horizontal coordination regarding sales regulations be-
cause each state applies its law only to those goods sold in-state. However,
this formal choice-of-law coordination fails to produce functional coordina-
tion in a market where nationwide sales distribution patterns force some
product manufacturers to comply with all laws for all of its sales (a factor
that concerned the Jones Court). Put differently, clear choice-of-law rules
fail to eliminate the application of multiple laws and the subsequent spillo-
ver effects.
Although our approach can help to rationalize the results of Jones and
Florida Lime, we do not purport to explain why the justices actually reached
166. Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 151-52.
167. Jones, 430 U.S. at 543.
168. Indeed, the majority's discussion in Florida Lime indicated that it believed Con-
gress was focused on local rather than national harvesting and marketing conditions. Florida
Lime, 373 U.S. at 147-50.
169. The majority in Jones seemed concerned about the possible inability of producers
to know whether their packages might ultimately land in California. See Jones, 430 U.S. at
543 ("[A] miller with a national marketing area would not know the destination of its flour
when it was packaged and would therefore have to assume that the flour would lose weight
during distribution. The national manufacturer, therefore, would have to overpack.").
170. Id. at 542-43.
171. Id.
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their conclusions. Importantly, preemption analysis may turn on a variety of
applicable policies as well as the statutory language and other evidence of
congressional intent. Moreover, other policy factors can trump our analysis
in appropriate cases, and clear legislative intent always trumps our analysis.
But when the preemptive effect of a statute is unclear, choice-of-law coordi-
nation by the states is, and should be, a relevant and sometimes dispositive
factor.
D. Implementing the Approach
This Section discusses how courts might implement our approach. In
general, we aim to enlist courts in preemption cases as active participants in
facilitating a federal system that takes account of the benefits both of diverse
state laws and of coordinating state law to accommodate markets that cross
state borders. Where the terms of a federal statute and other evidence of
congressional intent fail to provide guidance about whether state law is
preempted, the court should take account of the extent to which the states
have voluntarily allocated their sovereign authorities. Where states have ef-
fectively coordinated sovereign authority through choice-of-law rules or
uniform lawmaking, the court should uphold the state law unless another
policy cuts in the opposite direction. 172 This approach preserves state sover-
eignty when federalization of the law is unnecessary to facilitate clarity or
otherwise to promote a national market. On the other hand, when the states
have not horizontally coordinated and the federal statute applies to the given
situation, our approach supports giving the statute preemptive effect. 173
Our approach would require courts to develop standards of coordination.
This raises a host of questions. Just how many states need to agree to a sin-
gle choice-of-law approach? What if states agree on a general approach but
not on the circumstances where exceptions apply? What if some but not all
states permit parties to choose their governing law in a particular context? If
states agree on a formal choice-of-law approach, at what point is a national
scheme's interference with the allocation of state authority sufficient to trig-
ger a presumption in favor of preempting state law?
We do not purport to resolve those issues here. However, in answering
these questions, it is important to keep in mind a few general considerations.
First, complete coordination is likely an unreasonable standard. Even the
relatively rigid corporate internal affairs doctrine is deviated from in some
states under some circumstances.'74 Presumably it is sufficient if states have
172. This, of course, would not preclude holding the state law unconstitutional on
grounds other than the Supremacy Clause, including under the Dormant Commerce Clause or
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See supra Section III.A (discussing preemption in the con-
text of other constitutional doctrines).
173. Our approach does not, however, preclude the possibility that some other set of
policy concerns might support preserving state law even where this is inconsistent with a
healthy federalism.
174. California, for example, asserts authority to regulate some aspects of the internal
affairs of firms incorporated outside of California when the firm is not listed on a national
March 20131
Michigan Law Review
adopted (or have shown promise in adopting) choice-of-law rules that tend
to guard against regulatory spillovers by enabling the parties to choose or
know the law at the time of the relevant conduct. Second, timing of coordi-
nation is also relevant to this determination because the states need time to
work toward horizontal coordination. Thus, courts should not require full
coordination at the time of their decision unless it is reasonable to expect the
states to have already achieved such coordination. Third, the necessary de-
gree and timing of effective coordination might turn on the context in which
the laws operate. Because a healthy federalism balances the benefits of state
experimentation and diversity against the benefits of creating a national
market, the necessary degree of horizontal coordination likely will turn on
the relative perceived benefits of state and federal law. More benefits from
diversity suggest a greater tolerance for imperfect but promising coordina-
tion and vice versa.
Although these judgments entail some uncertainty in decisionmaking,
such standards can be worked out over time. 175 Working through these un-
certainties is justified by the coherent guidance that our approach can give to
courts and administrative agencies and our approach's firm grounding in
principles of federalism. A clearer approach, such as across-the-board pre-
sumptions in favor of or against preemption,"7 6 could reduce decisionmaking
costs but poses the risk of upsetting the important balance between federal
and state power. Moreover, our approach has the added benefit of encourag-
ing states to coordinate through choice-of-law rules, which would create
further potential benefits to decentralized lawmaking.
IV. SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
We have so far shown how a horizontal coordination approach to
preemption can enable courts to fill gaps in congressional intent based on
structural constitutional values intended to promote a healthy federalism.
This Part uses several Supreme Court cases to further illustrate how our ap-
proach can inform preemption jurisprudence.'77 These cases involve subjects
that illustrate one of five recurring situations relevant to our analysis: (1)
states have coordinated their choice-of-law rules so as to have achieved ef-
fective formal horizontal coordination; (2) states have clearly failed to
achieve such coordination; (3) states have formally coordinated choice-of-
securities exchange and most of its property and shareholders are in California. See CAL.
CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2006).
175. The courts might, for example, enlist the aid of the states themselves, through state
attorney general amicus briefs, in highlighting the degree of state coordination. For general
analyses of the use of state attorney general amicus briefs in the Supreme Court, see Christo-
pher R. Drahozal, Preserving the American Common Market: State and Local Governments in
the United States Supreme Court, 7 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 233 (1999); Michael E. Solimine,
State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REv.
355 (2012).
176. See supra Part IIH.B.
177. The Supreme Court hears preemption cases every term, and we are therefore unable
to speculate on whether or how our approach would apply to all possible preemption cases.
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law rules but functionally the substantive laws of one or more states end up
thwarting the practical effect of the substantive rules in other states; (4) the
preemption analysis is better delegated to an administrative agency rather
than a court because of factually unclear or temporally shifting horizontal
coordination; and (5) horizontal coordination should not control the analysis
because other policy considerations dominate.
A. Formal Coordination
In the cases discussed in this Section, states have achieved horizontal
coordination. Under our analysis, when congressional intent is unclear,
courts should refuse to preempt in the absence of an overriding policy con-
cern.
1. Corporate and Securities Law
As discussed above, states have achieved a high level of choice-of-law
coordination regarding corporate and other business association governance
by adopting the internal affairs doctrine. Under that choice-of-law rule, the
law of the firm's state of organization (i.e., "place of incorporation") applies
to the firm's governance and its members' liability for the firm's debts. This
rule fosters experimentation in state law with relatively little spillover cost.
It follows under our analysis that courts should decline to preempt where
congressional intent is unclear on the scope of preemption.
Our analysis supports the result in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America,78 where the Supreme Court upheld an Indiana law regulating ten-
der offers for control of an Indiana corporation. The Court reasoned that the
Williams Act, a federal law that mandates disclosure in connection with ten-
der offers, did not preempt the Indiana law. Despite possible delays that
could have resulted from applying the Indiana law, the Court reasoned that
nothing in its earlier cases "suggested that any delay imposed by state regu-
lation, however short, would create a conflict with the Williams Act."17 9
Rather, after reviewing the many state law provisions that would have simi-
lar effects, the Court reasoned that states' traditional regulation of corporate
governance supported a presumption against preemption. 180 However, under
current preemption presumptions, the Court alternatively might have rea-
soned either that Congress had occupied the field by adopting the Williams
Act or that the state law interfered with the objectives or purposes of the
federal law, and that therefore federal law preempted state law. Our regula-
tory coordination approach provides a way to avoid conflicting and
overbroad presumptions. Our analysis suggests that the Court instead should
have rejected preemption because the states have achieved horizontal coor-
dination around the internal affairs choice-of-law rule.
178. 481 U.S. 69, 78-87 (1987).
179. CTS, 481 U.S. at 85.
180. Id. at 86.
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The Court did in fact employ a regulatory coordination analysis in CTS,
but it did so when analyzing whether to invalidate the Indiana statute under
the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Court distinguished cases "invali-
dat[ing] statutes that may adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting
activities to inconsistent regulations": I8
The Indiana Act poses no such problem. So long as each State regulates
voting rights only in the corporations it has created, each corporation will
be subject to the law of only one State. No principle of corporation law and
practice is more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate do-
mestic corporations, including the authority to define the voting rights of
shareholders. Accordingly, we conclude that the Indiana Act does not cre-
ate an impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation by different States.'82
As we argued earlier, regulatory coordination is relevant to both consti-
tutional doctrines, but the necessary degree of horizontal coordination may
differ. For example, given that preemption analysis only occurs when Con-
gress has passed a statute that provides clear evidence of a federal policy,
more horizontal coordination may be necessary to insulate state law under
preemption than under Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. But the poten-
tially differing standards for horizontal coordination further justify
consideration of coordination in both contexts.
CTS also rejected the argument that the Indiana law should be invalidat-
ed based on the need to protect the national market for interstate tender
offers. Instead, the Court focused on the state "interest in promoting stable
relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters, as well
as in ensuring that investors in such corporations have an effective voice in
corporate affairs."'83 The Court also responded to economic arguments cit-
ing the value of the market for corporate control by observing that "[t]he
Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to any particular eco-
nomic theory."' 8 4 In sum, CTS stands for the basic principle underlying our
approach: diversity trumps uniformity in the presence of horizontal coordi-
181. Id. at 88.
182. Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
183. Id. at91.
184. Id. The value of coordination in resolving ambiguity concerning federal preemption
of state corporate law is apparent in light of an argument by Guhan Subramanian and his co-
authors that the Williams Act preempts Delaware's antitakeover statute. See Guhan
Subramanian et al., Is Delaware's Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional? Evidence from
1988-2008, 65 Bus. LAW. 685, 736 (2010). The authors evaluate Delaware's statute (and dis-
tinguish others) based on the precise extent to which it conflicts with the state-federal balance
decreed in the Williams Act, id. at 686, and they suggest that their analysis has implications
for the takeover laws of several other states, id. at 734-35. This reasoning could support inval-
idation of a wide swath of state corporate law. See Ribstein, supra note 144. Moreover, it is
not clear that one can fairly imply a complex preemption scheme from the Williams Act's very
general indications of legislative intent. Indeed, the authors acknowledge that Congress very
likely gave no consideration to the preemption of state takeover laws when passing the Act.
Subramanian et al., supra, at 690. Our coordination principle would resolve these questions by
presuming against preemption because the states have horizontally coordinated over corporate
law.
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nation and the absence of an overriding substantive federal law policy. Alt-
hough a determination of what counts as an overriding substantive federal
law policy is a normative one left to the courts, the horizontal coordination
principle remains a relatively objective determination that can be used to
effectively guide the analysis.
The coordination principle's role in resolving preemption issues in cor-
porate law cases is also relevant in the more complex context of state
securities regulation. Consider Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Dabit,185 a case involving SLUSA. As previously described in Part II,
SLUSA was enacted to cut off an attempted end run around the PSLRA. 18 6
Plaintiffs' lawyers were avoiding the PSLRA by suing under state securities
laws. 87 SLUSA preempted certain state law private securities class actions
that alleged fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered se-
curity." 88 Plaintiffs' lawyers then sued under state law on behalf of plaintiffs
who held rather than traded securities. They argued that these actions were
not "in connection with the purchase or sale of a ... security" and therefore
were outside the SLUSA preemption provision.'89 This argument was bol-
stered by a prior Supreme Court case, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, that had denied a holder a private right of recovery under similar
language in the securities laws.' 90
Dabit rejected the plaintiffs' arguments and extended SLUSA preemp-
tion to holder actions, distinguishing Blue Chip Stamps.' 91 The Court
reasoned that state holder actions would be inconsistent with Congress's
clear intent to control abusive state litigation. The result is not obvious under
traditional approaches to preemption. 192 Congress's intent to preempt state
holder actions is at least ambiguous in light of the prior Supreme Court case
on holders' rights to sue. Congress may have intended SLUSA to limit only
end-run litigation around the PSLRA rather than to generally control
abusive state securities litigation. Holder actions were not clearly PSLRA
end runs since the purchaser-seller requirement excluded them from federal
court irrespective of the PSLRA. Nor does the Court get much help from the
preemption presumptions. The Court said that the presumption against
preemption of state law did not apply because "federal law, not state law,
has long been the principal vehicle for asserting class-action securities fraud
185. 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
186. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4
(2006)); see also supra Part II.E. 1.
187. Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REv. 273, 292-93 (1998).
188. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(1) (2006).
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733, 754-55 (1975).
191. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 88-89 (2006).
192. See Larry E. Ribstein, Dabit, Preemption, and Choice of Law, 2006 CATO SuP. CT.
REv. 141, 146-47.
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claims." 193 Yet the states allowed securities fraud remedies even before the
adoption of the federal securities laws, and in those statutes, Congress ex-
plicitly preserved the state remedies. 94 Moreover, it is questionable whether
the existence of federal cases authorizing securities class actions should
provide the basis for presuming preemption based on Congress's supposed
intent to occupy the field.
The Dabit result makes more sense under our coordination principle.
The states had failed to effectively coordinate their sovereign authority over
securities laws, at least functionally. Although states had generally agreed
that corporations could be sued under the laws of each state in which their
securities were purchased, this clear and uniform choice-of-law rule had the
effect of subjecting a single corporation's conduct to multiple governing
state securities laws and therefore did not effectively coordinate states'
lawmaking authority. Given national and international securities markets
and firms' need to standardize their securities offerings, large states with
onerous securities standards like California could effectively impose their
securities laws on corporations everywhere, resulting in significant spillover
effects. Accordingly, despite the existence of a uniform choice-of-law rule,
the states had not achieved effective horizontal coordination. These circum-
stances supported resolving the issue in favor of preemption.
The appropriateness of applying the coordination principle is reinforced
in this case by Congress's incorporation of the coordination principle into
SLUSA. That statute provided for a so-called "Delaware carve-out," dis-
cussed earlier, 95 which exempted certain types of suits from preemption
"based upon the statutory or common law of the State in which the issuer is
incorporated."'' 96 There is evidence that Congress was concerned about in-
vading the important state corporate governance realm (particularly
Delaware's), and it crafted the exception to track the types of cases to which
Delaware itself had applied its law.197
The Dabit Court noted the relevance of the Delaware carve-out to its
preemption analysis by referring to "tailored exceptions to SLUSA's
pre-emptive command,' ' 98 which the Court said indicated that Congress was
not acting "cavalierly" in preempting state law.199 Dabit's reference to this
193. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 88.
194. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(a), 78bb(a).
195. See supra Section H.E. 1.
196. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(d)(1), 78bb(f)(3)(A).
197. See Jennifer O'Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Be-
tween the Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal
Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 475, 501-04 (2002).
198. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87.
199. Id. This was a reference to Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005),
in which the Court reasoned that "because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal
system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of
action" Id. at 449 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). Bates and
Lohr both applied a general presumption against preemption of traditional areas of state law, a
presumption that we have already critiqued, see supra Section III.C.
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language suggests that Congress's consideration of horizontal coordination
in a particular statute can support the Court's application of our approach in
deciding whether to apply that statute to preempt state law. We suggest that
courts apply the coordination approach as a policy matter even where Con-
gress did not specifically indicate its intent to apply it in a particular case.
Legislative intent may, however, provide an additional basis for emphasizing
regulatory coordination.
Continued developments may bear on state horizontal coordination and
therefore on the scope of federal preemption of state corporate and securi-
ties laws. There is evidence that cases governed by Delaware corporate law
are currently being filed outside of Delaware, 200 and that cases challenging
mergers under state securities law are being filed in multiple jurisdictions. °1
Delaware law does not and likely cannot compel cases to be brought in its
courts, and SLUSA's "Delaware carve-out" preemption exemption does not
depend on whether the cases are heard in Delaware despite legislative histo-
ry indicating that Congress's respect for Delaware courts was a justification
for the carve-out.
Congress, of course, has the last word on these issues. For example,
Congress can, among other things, explicitly preempt state corporate gov-
ernance rules despite state coordination on these matters, as it did to some
extent in the Williams Act and in Dodd-Frank.202 Although the states might
all agree to abide by the internal affairs doctrine, Congress might disapprove
of the laws that result from enabling the choice. 0 3 Under our approach,
courts nevertheless should continue to presume against preemption in these
cases, thereby effectively requiring Congress to make its preemption explicit
when it legislates on state corporate law.2°4
Finally, the scope of preemption in these situations depends on the cur-
rent level of state horizontal coordination and the costs and benefits of
federal law, and so could implicate questions of institutional competence,
200. See John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases? (Northwestern Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 10-03, 2010), available at http://ssrn.conabstract=1578404.
201. Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 349,
374 (2012).
202. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (requiring shareholder votes on executive com-
pensation); id. § 952 (requiring independent compensation committees); id. § 953 (requiring
executive compensation disclosures); id. § 954 (expanding "clawbacks" of executive compen-
sation); id. § 971 (clarifying Securities and Exchange Commission authority to promulgate
"proxy access" rule); id. § 972 (requiring disclosure of whether the same person holds both
chief executive officer and chairman of the board positions). For a brief summary of these
Dodd-Frank provisions, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Corporate Governance Provisions of
Dodd-Frank (UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-14, 2010), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1698898.
203. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REv. 588, 591-93 (2003).
204. Conversely, Congress could refuse to preempt state securities regulation despite the
absence of state coordination in that area, as it did with the federal securities laws; or it could




discussed below. Put differently, the situation arguably supports empowering
administrative agencies to determine the scope of preemption in light of
these ongoing developments.205
2. Real Property
Courts routinely decide cases regarding the ownership and use of real
property by reference to the law of the situs of the property 20 6 and, as
mentioned earlier, the situs rule has historically carried great weight.207 The
situs-based subject matter jurisdiction limitation has been watered down to
some extent,0 8 and, as a matter of choice of law, the situs rule is sometimes
relaxed in cases of divorce, 20 9 estate administration, 210 and secured loan
contracts. 21' Nevertheless, the situs rule's near-universal appeal supports a
narrow reading of federal statutes that could overlap with state property law.
To see how horizontal coordination around the situs rule can be relevant
to preemption analysis, consider Hayfield Northern Railroad Co. v. Chicago
& North Western Transportation Co.2t 2 Hayfield involved the Staggers Rail
Act, which governs the procedures for obtaining a certificate of abandon-
ment from the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC")-a prerequisite to
abandoning a railroad. 213 Pursuant to the Act, the ICC sets prices at which
shippers can buy or subsidize the railroad to prevent the abandonment.24 In
Hayfield, shippers brought post-abandonment proceedings in Minnesota
state court seeking state condemnation of a portion of the abandoned rail
line within Minnesota.21 5 The railroad argued that the Staggers Act preempt-
ed the state condemnation proceedings, but the Supreme Court disagreed. 216
The Court's discussion focused on whether field preemption was present
and, if not, whether the state condemnation proceeding would frustrate con-
gressional objectives. 217
205. See infra Section IV.D.
206. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 76, at 1054-57.
207. See supra note 76.
208. For example, the nonsitus state now can indirectly but not directly affect title to
property. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1909).
209. For example, marital rights to property can be determined according to the law of
the marital domicile at the time that the property was acquired. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 76,
at 603-05.
210. For example, some state statutes direct the situs state to defer to a determination by
the state of the decedent's domicile regarding the validity and construction of a will that pass-
es land. Id. at 1168-69.
211. See id. at 1060.
212. 467 U.S. 622 (1984).
213. Hayfield, 467 U.S. 622.
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Under our approach, the Court, after determining that there was no evi-
dence of congressional intent regarding state condemnation proceedings,
would have considered the degree of horizontal coordination regarding con-
demnation. Because it was clear where the track was located and states
would defer to the situs state for condemnation determinations, the Court
should have upheld the coexistence of state law. While the Staggers Act
provides a useful mechanism for determining the fate of an interstate line,
states should still be permitted to adjudicate condemnation of a local piece
of the line. Should Minnesota put in place rules for condemnation that inter-
fere with optimal business decisions, then it will suffer lower investment
within the state.
Consider also Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC,2 18 in which
a five-justice majority determined that under the Communications Act of
1934, the states could regulate depreciation rates and methods of classes of
property used by the telephone company only for intrastate telephone ser-
vice--even if that meant having to identify the percentages of a company's
interstate and intrastate service. 219 Here too horizontal coordination is effec-
tive if each state sets rates for intrastate property used to provide telephone
services within the state. The majority concluded that it did not matter that
state depreciation rates could affect the amount that customers paid and the
quality of interstate services because the Act specifically preserved state
authority over intrastate telephone service.220 If the Act had not included that
language, under our approach the Court would have asked whether, in fact,
state rates had caused spillover effects that interfered with the interstate pro-
vision of telephone services. If there had been spillover effects, then vertical
coordination would have called for the application of federal law to resolve
the problem. Otherwise, the states would have been deemed to achieve hori-
zontal coordination and would not have been denied jurisdiction over the
intrastate portion of a company's business.
3. Contractual Choice-of-Law
Choice-of-law rules for contracts are nonuniform. 22' Some courts focus
on the place of contracting, 222 some on the place of performance, 2 3 and
some on the location of one of the parties. 224 Nevertheless, in many contract
contexts, the states have achieved significant horizontal coordination by let-
ting contracting parties contract for the applicable law. For example, the
218. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
219. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. 355.
220. Id. at 358-59.
221. For a general discussion of choice of law for contracts, see SCOLES ET AL., supra
note 76, §§ 18.13-18.41.
222. Id. § 18.14.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., HIMC Inv. Co. v. Siciliano, 246 A.2d 502, 506 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1968) (applying law of location of the borrower); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 549
(Or. 1964) (applying law of the place of residence of the spendthrift defendant).
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Uniform Commercial Code enforces the parties' choice of the law of any
state that bears a reasonable relationship to the transaction.2 5 For other con-
tracts, virtually all states follow the Second Restatement, which allows
parties to choose any law to govern matters that the parties could have
resolved with specific contractual provisions (i.e., default rules).22 6 The Sec-
ond Restatement also lets parties choose their governing law even if a
connected state views its legal rule to apply notwithstanding a contrary con-
tractual provision (i.e., a mandatory rule). The choice-of-law clause is
enforced for mandatory rules if (1) the chosen state has a "substantial rela-
tionship to the parties or the transaction" or there is another "reasonable
basis for the parties' choice"; and (2) application of the law chosen would
not contravene "a fundamental policy of a state [with] a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue. 2 2
7
The Second Restatement places a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of
enforcing choice-of-law clauses. For many types of contracts today, courts
routinely and nearly uniformly enforce choice-of-law clauses. 28 In these
types of cases, enforcement of choice-of-law clauses provides the formal
coordination necessary to weigh against preemption.
States do not uniformly enforce choice-of-law clauses in some contract
settings, however, including contracts containing noncompete clauses, fran-
chise contracts, and consumer contracts.229 States may invoke their
"fundamental policy" concerns in favor of protecting local franchisees, con-
sumers, or employees. In order to bolster enforcement of choice-of-law
clauses, contract drafters may use choice-of-court clauses to direct disputes
to courts that are inclined to enforce contractual choice. States' enforcement
of choice-of-court clauses can restore any horizontal coordination that is
compromised by their nonenforcement of choice-of-law clauses. However,
enforcement of choice-of-court clauses is not fully effective for this purpose
to the extent that courts scrutinize them for public policy concerns. 230
Enforcement of arbitration clauses, like that of choice-of-court clauses,
can bolster horizontal coordination. Arbitration association rules routinely
225. U.C.C. § 1-301 (2008).
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971) ("The law of the
state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the
particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue.").
227. Id. § 187(2). The state with the materially greater interest is also the state whose
law would be chosen by the court in the absence of the choice-of-law provision. Id.
228. For empirical evidence of enforcement of choice-of-law clauses, see O'HARA &
RIBSTEIN, supra note 18, at 83-84 (examining cases decided before mid-2006), and Larry E.
Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REv. 363 (2003)
(examining 700 cases decided prior to 2003).
229. For a general discussion of court enforcement of choice-of-law clauses, see Erin
Ann O'Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of
Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551, 1558-69 (2000).
230. For a general discussion of enforcement of choice-of-court clauses, see SCOLES ET
AL., supra note 76, at 857-939.
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require arbitrators to apply the law chosen by the parties to resolve their
disputes."' However, states have traditionally been hostile to arbitration
because it removes matters from courts altogether. As discussed below, the
FAA preempted hostile state law rules.232 For contractual issues then, ques-
tions arise concerning the appropriate scope of federal preemption in the
face of substantial but incomplete horizontal coordination. We return to the
preemptive effect of the FAA below.
B. Formal Noncoordination
This Section discusses cases in which the states have clearly not
achieved horizontal coordination. These situations suggest that in the ab-
sence of contrary congressional intent or some good reason to retain chaotic
state laws, preemption is appropriate. In particular, we consider the two very
different contexts of products liability law and arbitration law.
1. Products Liability
Horizontal coordination is severely lacking in state products liability
law. Until the early twentieth century, products liability was treated as a
branch of sales law233 so that state sovereign authority was allocated accord-
ing to a traditional place-of-contract choice-of-law rule.234 As tort doctrines
for products-related injuries developed, however, products liability choice-
of-law rules began focusing on the place of injury.235 Under modern
approaches to choice of law for tort, courts focus on a number of factors,
including the place of the sale of the product, the place of injury, the domi-
cile of the plaintiff, and the location or place of design or manufacture by
the defendant. 236 Thus, each of these states' laws potentially can determine
the existence of a cause of action, available defenses, and damages, includ-
ing the possibility and amount of punitive damages. Given national
distribution chains and diverse choice-of-law approaches, these rules can
leave manufacturers unable to avoid application of strict liability rules to
their products. To make matters worse from a horizontal coordination stand-
point, the advent of the modem class action has enabled plaintiffs to sue in
231. E.g., International Centre for Dispute Resolution Arbitration Rules art. 28(1), avail-
able at http://www.adr.org (follow "Rules & Procedures" hyperlink; then follow "Rules"
hyperlink; then follow "International Dispute Resolution Procedures (Including Mediation
and Arbitration Rules) - English" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 3, 2013); JAMS Employment
Arbitration Rules and Procedures, Rule 24(c), available at http://jamsadr.com/rules-
employment-arbitration.
232. See supra note 101.
233. See generally Tim KAYE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY AND
CONUNDRA ch. 2 (2012).
234. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934).
235. See id. § 378.
236. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 76, §§ 17.64-17.76 (discussing approaches to choice
of law for products liability).
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states likely to apply plaintiff-favoring or certification-favoring laws to all of
the claims in their case. Thus, even long after the sale of a product, a court
can pick a state's products liability law to determine the manufacturer's lia-
bility. Manufacturers must therefore comply with the most onerous
standards to minimize their risk of liability.
Despite this lack of horizontal coordination, the executive branch of the
federal government has been reluctant to assert preemptive authority over
state tort law. This federal reluctance is indicated by President Obama's
memorandum stating a general administrative policy against preemption of
state law except after "full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the
States and with a sufficient legal basis for preemption.1237 President Obama
explained that preemption should be avoided, where possible, in order for
the states to serve the "distinctive circumstances and values" of their citi-
zens. 238 Quoting Justice Brandeis, the memorandum stated that "it is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and econom-
ic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."
239
Note that President Obama's memorandum cautions against executive
branch preemptive actions but nevertheless indicates that preemption would
be appropriate where the states are not exercising their "legitimate preroga-
tives" and where there is a sufficient legal basis for preemption. 240 Our
analysis provides such a basis: despite the potential value of Brandeis's "la-
boratory," jurisdictional competition is not always wealth increasing, and
when state laws create significant regulatory spillovers, vertical coordination
may be necessary to constrain the excesses of cumulative state sovereignty.
Given the states' failure to achieve effective choice-of-law coordination,
federal laws should trump overlapping state products liability laws, a result
that the Supreme Court does not always reach.
To illustrate the point, consider three recent Supreme Court opinions in-
volving federal laws that could preempt state products liability laws. In
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, plaintiffs attempted to sue a vaccine manufacturer
under Pennsylvania law when their daughter suffered a seizure disability
after being vaccinated.24' The Court held that the claim was preempted by
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.242 This Act created a
default compensation program to guarantee compensation to injured chil-
dren while protecting the vaccine market, which had nearly collapsed
because of an increase in vaccine-related tort suits. 243 The Court rejected
237. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg.





241. 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1074-75 (2011).
242. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1082.
243. Id. at 1073.
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plaintiffs' argument that the Act preempted only claims for defects that were
an unavoidable aspect of the specific vaccine. 2 " Congress had determined
that without national protection from state tort liability, drug companies
would not manufacture critical vaccines.2 4 5 The U.S. government argued in
favor of preemption because "[tJhe federal government has a unique policy
governing childhood vaccines, and that policy differs from those governing
most pharmaceuticals and medical devices. '246 Our regulatory coordination
approach would support preemption in this situation even absent a showing
of the federal government's "unique policy." The regulatory coordination
problems inherent in state tort liability for vaccine-related illness support
reading the Act broadly to prevent tort claims generally and not just those
inherent in a particular vaccine.
In addition, compare the Court's opinion in Geier, discussed above, 247
with Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.2 48 Both cases considered
whether federal products regulations preempt state tort claims and in both
cases, the majority and dissent disagreed over how the case should be decid-
ed. In Geier, the majority concluded that federal airbag regulations preempt
state tort actions for negligent and defective automobile design.2 49 In Wil-
liamson, the Court concluded that the same motor vehicle safety standard
involved in Geier, which also gave the manufacturer a choice between in-
stalling either a lap belt or a lap-and-shoulders belt on inner-rear seats, did
not preempt a California tort suit.2 ' The Court distinguished Geier on the
ground that the manufacturer-choice portion of the standard was not a sig-
nificant regulatory objective of the federal government. 251
Our approach would support preemption in both cases and would pro-
duce a different result in Williamson. Even if all states adhered to the
traditional place-of-injury choice-of-law rule, the inherent mobility of auto-
mobiles increases the number of potential state laws that could apply to
manufacturers when consumers are injured, thus enhancing the value of fed-
eral regulatory coordination. Making matters worse, modern approaches to
choice of law for torts often emphasize other connecting factors, thereby
undermining formal as well as functional coordination. Deferring to state
law could force automobile manufacturers to protect themselves from state
tort liability by placing the most protective device in all of their vehicles.
This could thwart the federal policy determination favoring gradual imple-
mentation and state experimentation by giving stricter state standards effect
beyond those states' borders. Thus, in Williamson, even without evidence
244. Id. at 1075-78.
245. Id. at 1084-85.
246. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 19,
Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (No. 09-152), 2010 WL 3017753.
247. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
248. 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011).
249. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881-82 (2000).




that Congress intended to preempt state regulation, the regulatory coordina-
tion analysis would fill the gap in legislative intent by supporting
preemption.
2. Arbitration
Arbitration is another area, like products liability, in which a strong state
policy supporting application of local law should yield to federal law be-
cause of the need for regulatory coordination. As discussed earlier,
predispute arbitration clauses, like choice-of-court clauses, enable parties to
override some states' opposition to contractual choice of law. 252 In a world
where commercial transactions often cross state and national borders, arbi-
tration is an important means by which parties restore some certainty
regarding the rules that apply to their conduct and to their disputes.
The key point about arbitration for present purposes is that the states
have been unable on their own to achieve horizontal coordination. Federal
arbitration law and policy resulted from significant international trade pres-
sures. Responding to competitive pressure from England's adoption of
arbitration laws in 1886, New York became the first U.S. state to enforce
arbitration clauses in 1920,253 followed by New Jersey in 1923.254 However,
other states, presumably with a different local interest-group mix, refused to
enforce arbitration clauses and awards. 255 Isolated state endorsements of
arbitration could not protect parties from suits in courts hostile to arbitra-
tion.25 6
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925 in response to lob-
bying by members of the New York Bar Association and the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce. 257 More recently, the United States signed the New York
Convention, which obligates member countries to enforce arbitration claus-
es and arbitrator awards except in certain circumstances. 5 8 Coupled with
choice-of-law clauses, federal enforcement of arbitration clauses now has
created vertical coordination for a wide range of interstate and international
activities. The Supreme Court has applied the FAA's pro-arbitration policy
to virtually all contractual disputes, including those that involve public law
252. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. For a discussion of other advantages of
arbitration, see O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 18, ch. 6.
253. New York Arbitration Act, ch. 275,2 N.Y. Laws 803 (1920).
254. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 42-43 (1992); see also Bruce
L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development
of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 481 (1995) (referring to New
York and New Jersey arbitration clause enforcement).
255. For a discussion of predominant court hostility to arbitration prior to the FAA, see
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 123-25 (4th ed. 2012).
256. Id.
257. Benson, supra note 254, at 495.
258. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (entered into force with respect to the United
States Dec. 29, 1970).
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claims.2 19 Even arbitration agreements in employment and consumer con-
tracts are enforceable, 60 despite strong countervailing state and federal
policies and weaker international trade pressures in that context. Indeed,
much of the rest of the developed world does not compel arbitration of em-
ployment and consumer contract disputes. 61 Although the Court arguably
could interpret the FAA to permit states to regulate arbitration of employ-
ment and consumer disputes, it has so far held to the contrary. 62
The preemption debate regarding arbitration centers on states' ability to
police unfair arbitration clauses. Section 2 of the FAA contains a savings
clause that permits states to scrutinize arbitration clauses on such "grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 263 Thus, although
states may not enact general anti-arbitration policies, they may apply general
contract doctrines such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability to scrutinize
individual agreements. 2 64 Some state and federal courts have used these doc-
trines to strike arbitration clauses that had the effect of preventing a claim
259. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987)
(claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act arbitrable); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629, 631 (1985) (antitrust
claims arbitrable); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (securities
claims arbitrable).
260. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (strik-
ing down a California class-waiver rule, designed to aid consumers, as applied to arbitration
on grounds that it conflicted with the policy underlying the FAA); Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991) (claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act arbitrable).
261. 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 817-29 (2009).
262. Section 1 of the FAA contains language that could be interpreted as prohibiting
application of the Act to employment contracts. CARBONNEAU, supra note 255, at 55-61. In
addition, § I defines "commerce" in a way that could be read as permitting courts to exclude
consumer contracts. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Su-
preme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 647-49 (1996)
(arguing that the FAA should be interpreted to apply to merchants but not consumers).
One notable exception to the universal enforcement of arbitration clauses is insurance
contracts because some courts have interpreted federal law delegating insurance regulation to
the states as taking precedence over the FAA. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 255, at 339-43
(discussing cases). Federal circuit courts, however, are split on this question, id. at 340, and
some courts have ruled that the FAA provisions that implement U.S. obligations under the
New York Convention are not preempted by the federal insurance law, which reverse-preempts
only an "Act of Congress" that interferes with state law. See, e.g., Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 587 F.3d 714, 723-24 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
263. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
264. After Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, some believed that the unconscionability doc-
trine was no longer a permissible means for state courts to scrutinize arbitration clauses. See,
e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center,
Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARE. 323, 380
(2011). However, in Marmet Health Care Center Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012), the
Court in a per curiam opinion suggested that states could use the unconscionability doctrine so
long as it was not employed as a blanket public policy prohibition on the use of arbitration
clauses for given contracts.
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altogether,265 or where the terms of the clause have appeared fundamentally
unfair to a party lacking bargaining power.26 6 These decisions prompted the
largest U.S. arbitration associations to adopt due process protocols and other
procedural rules designed to make it easier for consumers and employees to
bring their claims to arbitration.267
Arbitration has been particularly contentious in the context of class arbi-
tration. Class proceedings enable individuals to aggregate their small-value
claims in order to attract high-quality legal representation. California courts
thought it essential that consumers have access to class proceedings and, in
cases involving adhesion contracts, have effectively made it per se uncon-
scionable for a company to prohibit class proceedings for small-value claims
in court or in arbitration. 268 Although unconscionability is a contract doctrine
that seems to fall under section 2 of the FAA, California's use of the uncon-
scionability doctrine had broad implications for companies because it forced
them to either accept class arbitration, a particularly undesirable result, or en-
tirely eliminate resort to arbitration for customer disputes. Thus, class-action
waivers raise an issue where the FAA's preemptive intent is unclear, and there-
fore where our regulatory coordination approach applies.
The issue of preemption of class-action waivers in arbitration came to a
head in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, in which the Supreme Court
ruled that the FAA preempted California's per se unconsionability rule "as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. ' 26 9 The case involved a consumer class action alleg-
ing that AT&T had impermissibly charged its customers sales tax on the
265. See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 18, at 141-43 & nn.20-27 (discussing judicial
willingness to strike arbitration clauses as unconscionable if the contract works to make arbi-
tral relief prohibitively expensive for the nondrafting party).
266. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-40 (4th Cir. 1999)
(striking arbitration clause under state contract law principles where employer controlled list
of acceptable arbitrators and employee, but not employer, was required to share vital infor-
mation about her claims and witnesses); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.,
6 P.3d 669, 690-92 (Cal. 2000) (striking arbitration clause that required employee, but not
employer, to arbitrate her claims).
267. See, e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, Consumer Due Process Protocol,
available at http://www.adr.org (follow "Rules & Procedure" hyperlink; then follow "Codes &
Protocols" hyperlink; then follow "Consumer Due Process Protocol" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 3,
2013); JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses Minimum
Standards of Procedural Fairness, JAMS (July 15, 2009), http://www.jamsadr.con/rules-consumer-
minimum-standards/.
268. Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1 100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by Con-
cepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740. Technically, the applicability of the Discover Bank rule also requires
that the plaintiffs allege a deliberate scheme to defraud consumers. Id. However, given that
nothing stops plaintiffs from preserving their right to class proceedings with such allegations,
that requirement seems nonrestrictive, as indicated by the majority opinion in Concepcion,
131 S. Ct. at 1750.
269. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (internal quotation marks omitted). Actually, Justice
Thomas, one of the justices to join the five-justice majority, wrote a separate concurring opin-
ion reaffirming his prior disagreement with the Court's use of obstacle preemption. Id. at 1754
(Thomas, J., concurring). But he nevertheless joined the majority opinion. Id.
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value of phones that the company provided to the customers without
charge."' 0 The Concepcions' claim was worth $30.22.271 The customer ser-
vice agreement required the parties to arbitrate all of their disputes. 27 2 The
agreement required AT&T to (1) pay all arbitration costs for nonfrivolous
claims; (2) arbitrate in the county where the customer is billed; (3) permit
the customer to choose how the arbitration would proceed; (4) enable the
customer to instead sue in small-claims court; and (5) provide a prevailing
plaintiff with minimum relief and double attorneys' fees. 273 In short, the
contract arguably made individual arbitration for even small claims econom-
ically feasible. 27
4
A bare majority reasoned that the California rule was preempted because
the FAA reflects a strong congressional policy in favor of enforcing arbitra-
tion clauses according to the parties' preferences and treating arbitration
clauses on par with other contract terms. Four dissenters saw no conflict
between congressional objectives and the California rule and concluded that
the California rule was not directed at arbitration because it struck down
bans on both class arbitration and class litigation using the same standard.275
However, the majority concluded that the California rule's facial application
to nonarbitration proceedings did not place it within the savings clause be-
cause it had the effect of significantly interfering with two of the primary
benefits of arbitration: streamlined27 6 and informal277 proceedings. Although
parties are free to contract for class proceedings if they so choose, the ma-
jority thought that most parties would not prefer class arbitration.27 8 In
particular, "class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants" because
"[t]he absence of multilayered review makes it more likely that errors will
go uncorrected." '279 While both the majority and dissenting opinions focused
on congressional intent,280 their disagreement on this score helps to bolster




274. See Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 S. CT. REV.
1, 13-14.
275. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 1748 (majority opinion).
277. Id. at 1751.
278. Id. at 1752.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1744-53; id. at 1756-62 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas reasoned
that California's rule was expressly preempted, and he relied on a textual argument that "the
FAA requires that an agreement to arbitrate be enforced unless a party successfully challenges
the formation of the arbitration agreement, such as by proving fraud or duress." Id. at 1753.
Section 4 of the FAA compels a court to enforce an arbitration agreement "upon being satis-
fied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not
in issue." Id. at 1754. Section 2 defines the grounds preserved for nonenforcement relating to
"the making of the agreement." Id. at 1755. According to Justice Thomas, the California rule
was preempted because it "does not relate to defects in the making of an agreement." Id. at
1753. Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion because he noted that no party had briefed
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the conclusion that in fact Congress had formed no intent regarding whether
its savings clause would cover such state use of the unconscionability doc-
trine. Given (1) the lack of evidence of legislative intent; (2) the fact that the
justices split their votes along ideological lines; and (3) the language quoted
above, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Concepcion was ultimately
decided on the basis of the justices' views on freedom of contract. Our regu-
latory coordination approach would focus instead on the extent to which a
state's blanket prohibition on class waivers would create regulatory spillo-
vers.
The Concepcion dissenters supported their conclusion with an appeal to
federalism, but it was the wrong argument:
By using the words "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract," . . . Congress reiterated a basic federal idea
that has long informed the nature of this Nation's laws .... Here, recogni-
tion of that federalist ideal, embodied in specific language in this particular
statute, should lead us to uphold California's law, not to strike it down. We
do not honor federalist principles in their breach."5'
In our view, the "basic federal idea" and "federalist principles" that
should guide preemption must include a balancing of the desirability of state
experimentation with rules that sensibly allocate state sovereign authority.
Federalist principles that enable one state to change the governing legal
rules across the entire country will not promote a healthy federalism. As
noted in a Tennessee court case, California was likely the only state to ban
enforcement of all class waivers in arbitration clauses in consumer con-
tracts.282 Plaintiffs' attorneys seeking to avoid the class waiver could end-run
the law of the other forty-nine states by filing a nationwide class action in
the issue. Id. at 1754. However, this argument was made briefly in an amicus brief joined by
one of us. See Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors in Support of Petitioner at
31 n.7, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893).
281. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
282. 224 S.W.3d 698, 714 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) ("[W]ith the exception of courts sitting
in California, the vast majority of state and federal courts that have considered the question
have rejected the argument that class action and class arbitration waiver clauses are uncon-
scionable per se."). The class waiver rule, established in Discover Bank, provided as follows:
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which dis-
putes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and
when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums
of money, then ... the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party "from re-
sponsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another."
Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and
should not be enforced.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (alteration in original) (quoting Discover Bank v. Super. Ct.,
113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005)), The Concepcion majority concluded that despite its limiting
language, the rule worked functionally to ban class waivers in all consumer contracts. Id. at
1749-50.
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California state or federal courts.283 Because California's rule could apply to
contracts entered into in all fifty states by plaintiffs located in all fifty states,
California frustrated other states' legal experiments. This is regulatory he-
gemony rather than coordination.
Our theory does not take a normative position on either the desirability
of such plaintiff strategies or the validity of California's concern with com-
panies using arbitration clauses to insulate themselves from class
proceedings. Strong arguments favoring the California approach can be
made. Healthy federalism enables testing of alternative rules, including
those favoring enforcement of arbitration clauses, across the states. Califor-
nia's mandatory class arbitration is inconsistent with such experimentation
because it applies too broadly. If forcing consumers to proceed as individu-
als in fact undermines the vital deterrent function of class actions, and
individual state law experimentation cannot work due to the nature of class
litigation, then the issue is most appropriately resolved with a federal rule.
Put differently, in the context of class litigation, the balance between federal
government coordination and state law experimentation weighs in favor of
federal government action.
Congress is certainly capable of stepping in to resolve this difficult ques-
tion. For example, Congress has been considering an "Arbitration Fairness
Act" which would prohibit enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses in
employment and consumer contracts, as well as contracts that implicate a
civil rights statute.28 4 Even without this statute, a court might hold that au-
thorizing arbitration in some situations conflicts with overriding national
policies reflected in other statutes.285 Our point here is not to defend any
particular approach to resolving the substantive policy issue in Concepcion,
but rather to illustrate the strengths of our regulatory coordination analysis
relative to an exclusive focus on legislative intent.
C. Functional Noncoordination
Even in situations where choice-of-law rules allocate state sovereign au-
thority reasonably as a formal matter, there might be no functional
coordination because of how the formal rules work in certain types of cases.
Typically, the functional coordination problem occurs where a formal
choice-of-law rule works to sensibly allocate sovereign authority in some
but not all cases; the rule as applied to a subset of matters creates a situation
that causes costly spillovers. This Section provides two examples of formal
rules that work for general types of cases but fail to appropriately handle
283. The trial court decision in Concepcion was issued by a federal district court in Cali-
fornia that applied the state law rule on the ground that it was exercising diversity jurisdiction
over the class action. Concepcion 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
284. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011).
285. Unfortunately, the Court appears to have narrowed this possibility recently in Com-
pucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012), in which it suggested that the FAA
mandates are only inapplicable where Congress explicitly makes that determination.
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some specific problems: state environmental laws and state products regula-
tions.
1. Environmental Law
Because environmental hazards and harms often run with property, the
situs rule can provide formal coordination of state sovereign authority over
such problems. Formal coordination does not, however, obviate the need for
federal coordination in some contexts. Some environmental harms resemble
torts, where state choice-of-law rules have failed to achieve regulatory
coordination. Also, even where formal coordination exists through the situs
rule, environmental harms that extend beyond the situs can create spillover
problems. In order to demonstrate the role of functional coordination, this
Section begins by discussing the application of formal horizontal coordina-
tion to environmental law.
After more than forty years of federal environmental regulation by Con-
gress and executive agencies, environmental law might appropriately fall
into the field preemption category. However, a horizontal coordination ap-
proach counsels a different result. Many environmental effects such as solid
waste, smog, and most water pollution lie within state lines and may be sub-
ject to state regulation. Moreover, much state regulation of environmental
harms is through property or nuisance law, areas where the law of the "si-
tus" state governs.28 6 Applying state laws in these situations can provide
geographic variation and experimentation287 while effectively containing
each state's sovereign authority. Moreover, where land use is subject to vol-
untary arrangement and does not inflict harm on third parties, a contractual
choice-of-law approach may provide sufficient horizontal choice-of-law
coordination to promote a healthy federalism.288 Preemption, therefore, may
not be appropriate under our approach.
Consider, for example, Engine Manufacturers Association v. South
Coast Air Quality Management District.28 9 Section 209 of the Federal Clean
Air Act prohibits the adoption or attempted enforcement of any state or local
"standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines. '290 Congress may have federalized emissions
standards out of concern that more restrictive regulations in one or a few
states could end up governing the production and sale of motor vehicles
across the country. Congress may also have been concerned that, because
automobiles are inherently mobile, less restrictive regulations in one or a
286. See supra text accompanying note 76.
287. Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Misnatch in Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 137 (2005).
288. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Market for Conservation Law 14-20 (Univ. Ill. Law &
Econ. Research Paper No. LE10-009, 2010), available at http://ssm.conlabstract=1609793
(proposing to let property owners enter into conservation easements under the laws of states
other than where their property is located).
289. 541 U.S. 246 (2004).
290. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006).
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few states could end up causing unwanted pollution in states with higher
emissions standards.
In Engine Manufacturers, the Los Angeles-area air quality management
district promulgated air quality rules under which local fleet operators-
including operators of street sweepers, trucks, waste collection vehicles,
taxicabs, and so forth-could buy or lease only vehicles that met stringent
emissions standards.29" ' The Court struck down the rules as directly violating
§ 209 and remanded the case for consideration of several issues, including
whether the internal purchasing decisions by state and local governments
could withstand preemption.2 92 The remand arguably reflected a judgment
that § 209 would not impose significant spillovers on other states because
government vehicle purchases are unlikely to affect the national market and
therefore do not require federal regulation.
Some environmental hazards, however, do cross state lines and therefore
might not be adequately handled by choice-of-law rules that achieve formal
coordination for other areas of environmental law. These hazards include
water pollution affecting interstate watersheds and interstate industrial and
other air pollution. Thus, some states' lax pollution laws can reduce the abil-
ity of other states to address their pollution problems. Conversely, overly
strict pollution rules can sometimes impose nationwide costs on firms, as
mentioned above in the context of automobile manufacturers attempting to
comply with state-by-state emissions standards. In contexts where environ-
mental hazards cross state lines, our approach supports federal preemption
of state laws as a remedy for state failures to horizontally coordinate.
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette 93 nicely illustrates this reasoning.
The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of effluents into the navigable
waters of the United States without a federal government permit. Although
the Environmental Protection Agency has authority to effectively regulate
water pollution through the permit scheme,2 94 a savings clause in the Act
provides that "[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person ... may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement
of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief."2 95 Other
Clean Water Act provisions and federal regulations empower states in which
pollution sources are located to participate in permitting decisions2 96 and to
impose pollution standards more stringent than those of the federal govern-
ment.2 97 In Ouellette, Vermont landowners brought a Vermont common law
nuisance action in Vermont state court against a pulp and paper mill located
on a lake in New York.2 98 Pollutants discharged by the mill had apparently
291. Engine Mfrs., 541 U.S. at 249-51.
292. See id. at 255, 258-59.
293. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
294. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1342 (2006).
295. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).
296. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 490.
297. Id. at 489-90.
298. Id. at 484.
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damaged Vermont land situated along the same lake.2 99 Despite the relative-
ly broad language of the savings clause, the Supreme Court interpreted the
Clean Water Act to permit relief only according to the laws of the state in
which the pollution source was located.300 Plaintiffs thus could sue under
New York but not Vermont nuisance law.
Importantly for our purposes, and unique for preemption cases, the ma-
jority actually used choice-of-law reasoning to justify its conclusion:
Application of an affected State's law to an out-of-state source also
would undermine the important goals of efficiency and predictability in the
permit system. The history of the 1972 amendments shows that Congress
intended to establish "clear and identifiable" discharge standards ....
[U]nder the reading of the saving clause proposed by respondents, a source
would be subject to a variety of common-law rules established by the dif-
ferent States along the interstate waterways. These nuisance standards
often are "vague" and "indeterminate." The application of numerous
States' laws would only exacerbate the vagueness and resulting
uncertainty....
For a number of different states to have independent and plenary regu-
latory authority over a single discharge would lead to chaotic confrontation
between sovereign states. Dischargers would be forced to meet not only
the statutory limitations of all states potentially affected by their discharges
but also the common law standards developed through case law of those
states. It would be virtually impossible to predict the standard for a lawful
discharge into an interstate body of water. Any permit issued under the Act
would be rendered meaningless."'
Justice Brennan dissented and, in an opinion signed by three justices, al-
so invoked state choice-of-law reasoning:
The Act provides no support for deviation from well-settled conflict-of-law
principles. Under conflict-of-law rules, the affected State's nuisance law
may be applied when the purpose of the tort law is to ensure compensation
of tort victims. "It is beyond dispute" that affected States have "a signifi-
cant interest in redressing injuries that actually occur within the State."3 2
Justice Brennan's reasoning is problematic in two respects. First, as not-
ed earlier,30 3 the traditional place-of-injury rule for torts has been displaced
in most states with multifactored standards that create significant differences
as well as significant uncertainty regarding the governing laws. Second,
even if states had continued to adhere to a place-of-injury rule, formal allo-
cation of sovereign authority regarding many traditional torts and nuisances
has failed to achieve functional coordination in the regulation of interstate
299. Id.
300. Id. at 493-94.
301. Id. at 496-97 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
302. Id. at 502 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984)).
303. See supra Section II.C.
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pollution-a context in which multiple legal standards could apply to the
same conduct. A source-state rule could lead to underregulation of pollution
in a world where pollution is regulated exclusively by the states. Some states
might be tempted to relax their pollution standards in order to attract firms,
jobs, and tax bases, especially if the environmental harms could largely be
exported into other states.3°4
The Clean Water Act does permit some state variation, however. The Act
preserves the rights of states to experiment with tort laws and otherwise to
provide greater protection of the environment while limiting the number of
state laws to which a source can be exposed. If injured states seek greater
protection from pollution sources located in other states, they can appeal to
Congress. This structure, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, arguably ac-
commodates federal environmental goals while promoting a healthy
federalism.
2. Products Regulation
Our earlier discussion of the possible distinction between California's
avocado and flour weight regulations suggests the potential difficulty of de-
termining whether state products regulations should be subject to
preemption by federal law that also regulates product sales.30 5 Products reg-
ulation differs from products liability in that state choice-of-law rules for
products regulations often allocate sovereign authority much more cleanly
than do state choice-of-law rules for products liability. With products regula-
tion, the state most often applies its regulations to sales that occur within the
state. These choice-of-law rules provide sensible formal allocation of sover-
eign authority, but they might not ensure functional coordination where sellers
cannot tailor their products to fit the regulation of particular states. This may
justify federal preemption despite the presence of formal coordination.
Whether sellers can effectively tailor their products to comply with vary-
ing state regulations may involve complicated factual inquiries requiring
expertise in the particular product market. For example, in our earlier analy-
sis we suggested that interstate distribution of avocados might have differed
significantly from the distribution of flour. That analysis may not, however,
be factually correct. Also, as product markets and their distribution chains
develop over time, the extent to which sellers can tailor their products to
conform to differing state laws can change. This is particularly true for fast-
moving markets like electronic commerce. 306  Because functional
304. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandat-
ing State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-12,
1215-16 (1977). Others question the plausibility of such claims. See Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
305. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
306. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation of Electronic Com-
merce, 51 EMORY L.J. 1, 52-55 (2002) (discussing relevance of geographic identifiers to
analyzing need for federal regulation of electronic commerce).
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coordination for a particular product market requires both fact-specific and
dynamic determinations, these preemption determinations might appropri-
ately be delegated to administrative agencies.30 7 We turn now to the question
of institutional competence for preemption.
D. Agency Preemption
Our approach works well in the hands of judges in cases where the de-
gree of state horizontal coordination, both formally and functionally, is
static over time and the factual determinations relevant to preemption are
relatively straightforward. Where state coordination is evolving or otherwise
likely to change over time, or where courts find it difficult to determine
whether the relevant markets are prone to regulatory spillovers, preemption
determinations become more difficult for courts and might be better made
by administrative agencies. Although this difficulty surely exists in other
circumstances, here we focus on the example of consumer credit, where
both the Supreme Court and Congress have weighed in on the extent to
which preemption determinations made by the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency ("OCC") deserve respect.
Prior to the Supreme Court's involvement in 1978, consumer credit and
loans were primarily regulated by state laws. Even national banks could
charge no more than the interest rate allowed by the state in which the bank
was "located"30 8 or any rate above the maximum allowed for state regulated
banks.30 9 State usury statutes varied, with some states setting fixed rates and
others setting maximum rates that fluctuated with inflation.3 1° State choice-
of-law rules also varied. Although most applied usury laws based on the
borrower's residence,3" there is evidence that some applied the law of the
place of contract or of the bank's home state, while others applied local
law.3 12
307. Cf. Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1195-96 (1995) (noting that agencies have
comparative advantage in utilizing specialized, technical, and contextual knowledge); David
S. Rubenstein, "Relative Checks": Towards Optimal Control of Administrative Power, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2169, 2184 (2010) (noting that agencies are relatively more flexible in re-
sponding to changing conditions).
308. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006).
309. See Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873) (interpreting the
National Bank Act to provide that a general rate ceiling, not a lower one for state banks, con-
trols).
310. For a discussion of state usury legislation during the 1970s and 1980s, see Steven
W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and Unconscionability: The Case for
Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest Rates Under the Unconscionability
Standard, 31 Hous. L. REv. 721, 732-33 (1994).
311. Mark Furletti, Comment, The Debate over the National Bank Act and the Preemp-
tion of State Efforts to Regulate Credit Cards, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 430 (2004).
312. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 158, at 905-06 (discussing default principles for
choice of law for loan agreements and citing cases from the 1970s).
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Whether or not states were evolving toward an agreed allocation of their
sovereign authority is somewhat unclear, however, because starting in 1978,
the Supreme Court interpreted the National Bank Act to impose a federal
choice-of-law rule for permissible consumer credit interest rates charged by
national banks.3" 3 Under this rule, national banks could charge any interest
rate permitted by the state in which the bank was chartered, regardless of the
location of the borrower, subject matter of the loan, or other potential con-
nections. 1 4 The same rule has been extended to fees associated with credit
cards.315 The Supreme Court has also held that bank subsidiaries can charge
any interest rates and fees permitted in the state in which the parent is char-
tered.3 1
6
The federally imposed choice-of-law rules eliminate any problems
associated with formal choice-of-law coordination. The clear charter-state
rules help banks identify the laws to which their loans will be subject with-
out worrying about whether courts will scrutinize their agreements ex post
according to the law of another state. Moreover, the federal choice-of-law
rules enable credit card companies and other lenders to effectively choose
the law that will govern their agreements, thus enabling firms to choose the
laws that best fit their needs as well as providing forces for beneficial juris-
dictional competition.
Unlike some of the other areas where we have identified clear choice-of-
law rules, however, the consumer credit choice-of-law rules are not the
result of states voluntarily coalescing toward a single approach to allocating
sovereign authority. While federally imposed choice-of-law rules can pro-
vide some of the same benefits, horizontal coordination's structural benefits
may not exist unless the states agree to the rules. In response to this federal-
ly imposed choice-of-law rule, states like Delaware and South Dakota
repealed their usury laws and do not regulate the fees charged in consumer
credit contracts. 17 Naturally, credit card companies relocated to these states.
Other states have been forced to relax their consumer credit regulations in
order to prevent further exodus by lenders.318
In short, while formal choice-of-law coordination exists for consumer
credit law, the fact that it has been federally imposed rather than state-led
has enhanced the likelihood of the rule generating functional coordination
problems for the states. Delaware and South Dakota may have triggered a
race to the bottom that has the effect of imposing regulatory spillovers in
313. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
308 (1978).
314. Id. at 313.
315. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 737, 744-45 (1996).
316. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 17 (2007).
317. John P. Seidenberg, et al., States Create Friendly Climate for Card Issuers by Re-
pealing Usury Laws (South Dakota, Nevada, Delaware, and Arizona), CARD NEWS, June 3,
1991, available at http://business.highbeam.com/4008/article- I GI -10980957/states-create-
friendly-climate-card-issuers-repealing.
318. O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 18, at 48.
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other states. If states could decide whether to apply these other states' rules,
then a more healthy experimentation with consumer credit protections might
have been possible. Of course, it is also possible that the federally imposed
rules have facilitated a vibrant national market in consumer credit that
would not have been feasible had growth of this market depended on the
slow evolution of state choice-of-law policies. But given the way in which
the federal choice-of-law rule was imposed on the states, we cannot tell
which course better promotes a healthy federalism.
The Supreme Court has construed the federally imposed rule broadly. In
Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,
the Court reasoned that Congress, in enacting the National Bank Act, was
aware of the potentially interstate nature of the banking business and "in-
tended to facilitate" this national business." 9 The Court therefore rejected
petitioners' argument that the "'exportation' of interest rates" would "sig-
nificantly impair the ability of States to enact effective usury laws." In any
event, "the protection of state usury laws is an issue of legislative policy, and
any plea to alter § 85 to further that end is better addressed to the wisdom of
Congress than to the judgment of this Court.' 320
The above analysis assumes that the only available choices were be-
tween tolerating a slowly evolving state equilibrium and imposing a rigid
federal rule. However, an alternative approach is to allocate the determina-
tion of the appropriate scope of preemption of state consumer credit laws to
an administrative agency. The Supreme Court has exhibited a willingness to
defer to agency preemption determinations in this area. In 2007, the Court in
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.3 21 upheld a determination by the OCC that
national banks' operating subsidiaries are subject to the same rules as their
parent companies, including rules regulating interest rates and fees.3 22 This
deference was mitigated by Dodd-Frank, under which Congress partially
reduced the OCC's preemption authority.32 3 Dodd-Frank seems to express
an ideological or political viewpoint rather than a structural one: it appears
that Congress simply disliked the preemption decisions that the OCC was
rendering.
Despite the rejection of this approach in Dodd-Frank, there is much to
be said for leaving cases of indeterminate horizontal coordination to admin-
istrative agency discretion. For example, suppose the federal law leaves
319. 439 U.S. 299, 314-15 (1978).
320. Marquette, 439 U.S. at 319.
321. 550 U.S. 1 (2007). For a discussion of the agency's preemption determination, see
Bressman, supra note 9, at 614-16.
322. The OCC's decision seems to have been related more to the perceived need for a
national credit market than for regulatory coordination. See Bressman, supra note 9, at 615-
16. Our point is slightly different, but the Court's deference to any agency determination lends
support to the notion that such deference does occur where deemed appropriate.
323. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1044(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2015-16 (2010) (reducing the level of deference courts
must give OCC preemption determinations and requiring the OCC to have "substantial evi-
dence" for such determinations).
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preemption decisions to an administrative agency. Then suppose the states
change the choice-of-law rule for consumer credit transactions from a con-
tract-based to a tort-based rule, perhaps responding to Elizabeth Warren's
argument analogizing financial products to dangerous nonfinancial prod-
uCtS.32 4 Conversely, states might move toward greater coordination, for
example by adopting a lender place-of-incorporation rule for credit transac-
tions not covered by existing federal law. Vesting power in an agency has the
benefit of enabling preemption to more easily respond to changes in the
conditions relating to the need for federal law.
Preemption determinations could also vary with changes in the market,
such as innovations in consumer finance. Consider, for example, the advent
of payday loans, which are sometimes structured so that the loans are made
by banks.3 25 Payday loans involve very high interest rates and fees compared
to credit cards, but they enable consumers to obtain quick access to cash to
carry them over until the next payday.3 26 Many states have begun to regulate
these loans. 327 At least some of these loans may be governed by the National
Bank Act, and the Act might be interpreted to preempt the state regulations.
The OCC, however, has so far taken the position that the National Bank Act
does not preempt the state regulations. 328 This gives states the chance to ex-
periment with differing regulations while also giving them an opportunity to
coalesce toward a coherent allocation of sovereign authority. If the states fail
over time to effectively coordinate their choice-of-law policies regarding
payday loan regulations, the OCC could reverse course toward preemp-
tion.32 9
E. The Limits of Horizontal Coordination
Although we offer an approach to preemption that can help inform many
cases, it would be a mistake to conclude that the approach informs all
324. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, at 8, 8-9.
325. Sometimes the payday lenders partner with banks, but more recently banks seem to
be offering short-term lending services that resemble payday loans. See Payday Lending-
Research & Analysis, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, http://responsiblelending.org/
payday-lending/research-analysis/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
326. Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest-Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday
Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REv. 563, 606, 610 (2010).
327. See Leah A. Plunkett & Ana Lucia Hurtado, Small-Dollar Loans, Big Problems:
How States Protect Consumers from Abuses and How the Federal Government Can Help, 44
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 31, 37-48 (2011).
328. Angela Littwin, Testing the Substitution Hypothesis: Would Credit Card Regula-
tions Force Low-Income Borrowers into Less Desirable Lending Alternatives?, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REv. 403,418.
329. To help ensure the quality of the agency's determinations, Congress could provide
guidance regarding how and when to make preemption determinations. To guard against the
most problematic agency decisions, agency action should be subject to the procedural safe-
guards that attach to other agency decisionmaking-including notice-and-comment
requirements-and it should be subject to court review to ensure that the decisions are con-
sistent with congressional command.
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preemption cases. If in enacting federal law Congress is at least partly moti-
vated by the desire to ensure that individuals and firms need only comply
with one law, then it makes sense to ask whether the related state laws have
been horizontally coordinated as a formal and functional matter. On the oth-
er hand, when Congress has in mind a federal policy that it hopes to further
without regard to state coordination, national policy might trump horizontal
coordination. In this situation, our approach might not prove particularly
helpful in resolving preemption questions.
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting,33 ° a recent Su-
preme Court case that involved the intersection of state business license law
with federal immigration policies, illustrates this limit on horizontal coordi-
nation. The federal Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA") makes it
unlawful to employ a known unauthorized alien,33" ' requires employers to
verify each employee's eligibility for employment, provides an e-verify sys-
tem as one mechanism for verifying eligibility,32 and preempts state
sanctions for employing illegal aliens "other than through licensing and sim-
ilar laws." '333 The Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007 ("LAWA") requires all
entities conducting business within Arizona to similarly verify employee
eligibility, but unlike the IRCA, LAWA requires employers to use the e-
verify system. LAWA also provides for suspension or revocation of Arizona
business licenses of employers who knowingly or intentionally employ un-
authorized aliens.334 LAWA defines "license" to include documents such as
articles of incorporation, certificates of partnership, and grants of authority
to foreign companies to transact business in the state.335
The Whiting Court held that the IRCA did not expressly or impliedly
preempt the Arizona statute. Specifically, the majority concluded that the
Act's preservation of state "licensing and similar laws" is broad enough to
encompass Arizona's conditions on articles of incorporation, certificates of
partnership, and grants of authority to foreign firms. 336 The dissenters rea-
soned that LAWA conflicts with Congress's intent to impose a uniform
system of immigration enforcement on the states, although the two dissent-
ing opinions emphasized different sources of conflict.337
As with the other cases discussed in this Part, evidence of congressional
intent is inconclusive, so one might think it appropriate for a court to con-
sider, as a factor in its analysis, the degree of horizontal choice-of-law
coordination present in state licensing of employers. Indeed, in the employ-
ment context, states mostly internalize the costs and benefits of their laws.
330. 131 S. Ct. 1968(2011).
331. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2006).
332. Id. § 1324a(b).
333. Id. § 1324a(h)(2).
334. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212.01(F) (2010).
335. Id. § 23-211(9).
336. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1978 (2011).
337. See id. at 1987-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 1998-2007 (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing).
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Arizona's licensing rules regulate the employer in relation to its employ-
ment of individuals within the state,3 8 and the employer can easily control
the state in which an employee works. Given that Arizona is a small state,
interstate businesses that find the law unduly onerous can presumably exit
without substantial loss. Thus, Arizona will be forced to internalize the costs
of the LAWA if its burden is unreasonable. And given that both the defini-
tion of an illegal worker and the substantive standards for what constitutes
verification remain federal rules, any state experimentation in withholding
permission to conduct business in the state is unlikely to interfere with na-
tional immigration policy.
The Arizona law is a good illustration of the potential benefits of state
diversity. One writer noted that the Arizona law
reduced Arizona's population of working-age illegal immigrants by about
17 percent, or roughly 92,000 people, in just a single year .... And the
swift attrition was mainly achieved through voluntary compliance: the
number of employers prosecuted under the law can be counted on one
hand. These results suggest that maybe-just maybe-America's immigra-
tion rate isn't determined by forces beyond any lawmaker's control. Maybe
public policy can make a difference after all. Maybe we could have an
immigration system that looked as if it were designed on purpose, not em-
braced in a fit of absence of mind.339
State experimentation thus could provide data about the effects of specific
approaches and thereby inform future policymaking.
At root, however, the federal law regarding immigration reflects national
goals. Choice-of-law coordination across the states cannot take care of the
concern behind congressional legislation in this area because the federal
government seeks a single government policy for immigration. In our view,
this is not an area where Congress acts under the Commerce Clause to coor-
dinate commerce among the states but rather acts to effectuate a distinctly
national policy. In general, federal immigration laws cannot coexist with
state policies, even when it is clear which state's laws might apply. Disa-
greement between the majority and dissent in Whiting reflects a
disagreement over whether the state law supports or hinders federal policy.
In this sense, they disagree about the federal policy at issue. The majority
focuses on the fact that the state policy helps further the federal goal of pre-
venting the employment of illegal aliens. The dissent seems focused instead
on the hostile symbolism of Arizona's law and the fact that added licensing
sanctions could force employers to somehow discriminate against legal im-
migrants. However one views these issues, state coordination over the
applicability of business license laws does not seem to aid the analysis.
A similar conclusion holds for the Court's most recent preemption deci-
sion involving additional laws promulgated by Arizona in an attempt to
combat illegal immigration. In Arizona v. United States, a five-justice
338. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212A.




majority struck down provisions of a state statute that criminalized a failure
to comply with federal registration requirements as well as knowingly at-
tempting to seek unauthorized employment in Arizona.34 ° In addition, the
statute expanded both the powers and the responsibilities of state law en-
forcement authorities over the investigation and arrest of suspected illegal
aliens.3 41 All but the first of these provisions clearly delineate the territorial
reach of the statute to employee and law enforcement activities occurring
within state borders, so from a horizontal coordination perspective these
provisions do not appear to be troublesome.3 42 Notwithstanding the fact that
these laws are consistent with the goals of horizontal coordination, the ma-
jority concluded that three out of the four provisions (all but the police
investigative provision) interfere with the federal immigration scheme. The
concurring and dissenting opinions found that the preempted provisions
were in fact consistent with federal policy,343 and Justice Scalia insisted that
it was the administration's failure to carry out congressional intent that
compelled Arizona to act. 344 Despite the disagreement among the justices
regarding the substance of federal policy, it is clear that here, too, the federal
interest in creating substantive immigration policy eliminates the utility of
our approach.
CONCLUSION
We suggest an approach to resolving preemption cases that asks courts
to take into account the extent to which the states have formally and func-
tionally coordinated their sovereign authority over the legal question at
issue. A common justification for replacing state with federal law is the
need for a unified standard in order to attract international trade or to pro-
vide guidance to private parties. However, a federal substantive law is but
one means to achieve that goal. Sometimes clarity can be obtained through
state laws subject to coordinated choice-of-law approaches. This latter
340. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).
341. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506.
342. The provision making it an offense to fail to comply with the federal scheme could
create difficulties regarding the scope of its applicability. By its terms it appears to apply uni-
versally. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (2010), preempted by Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at
2501-02.
343. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2522 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Arizona has moved to protect its sovereignty-not in contradiction of federal law, but in
complete compliance with it. The laws under challenge here do not extend or revise federal
immigration restrictions, but merely enforce those restrictions more effectively."); id. at 2524
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting "the lack of any conflict be-
tween the ordinary meaning of the Arizona law and that of the federal laws at issue here"); id.
at 2525 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that congressional intent
to preempt Arizona law provisions was unclear).
344. See id. at 2517 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing the
administration's "deliberate inattention to the presence of removable aliens in Arizona"); id. at
2520 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that federal enforcement
efforts had given "short shrift" to the illegal aliens present in Arizona).
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possibility promotes a healthy federalism because the benefits of state
law-experimentation, jurisdictional competition, and diverse options-
can be retained. In such circumstances, courts should be reluctant to
conclude that state laws are preempted. Where, however, sovereign author-
ity over state laws is uncoordinated, either as a functional or a formal
matter, then courts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of preemp-
tion of state law. In cases of uncertain or dynamic coordination of state
sovereign authority, Congress should consider delegating preemption de-
terminations to federal agencies.
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